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IN THE HOT BOX AND ON THE TUBE: WITNESSES'
INTERESTS IN TELEVISED TRIALS
Stacy R Horth-Neubert
INTRODUCTION
In the 16 years since the Supreme Court authorized state experi-
mentation with cameras in the courtroom in Chandler v. Florida,'
state rules in this area have been continuously revised and scruti-
nized.2 While much attention has been paid to the effect of broadcast
media coverage on defendants,3 victim-witnesses,4 jurors,5 and the
1. 449-U.S. 560, 583 (1981) (holding that the Constitution does not prohibit states
from permitting cameras in the courtroom).
2. For summaries of the general history of cameras in the courtroom, see, e.g.,
Chandler, 449 U.S. at 562-66; Douglas S. Campbell, Free Press v. Fair Trial: Supreme
Court Decisions Since 1807 (1994); Carolyn Stewart Dyer & Nancy R. Hauserman,
Electronic Coverage of the Courts: Exceptions to Exposure, 75 Geo. .J. 1633, 1641-46
(1987); Christo Lassiter, TV or Not TV-That is the Question, 86 J. Crim. L & Crimi-
nology 928, 936-59 (1996) [hereinafter Lassiter, The Question]; Peter O'Connell et al.,
Radio-Television News Directors Association, News Media Coverage of Judicial Pro-
ceedings with Cameras and Microphones: A Survey of the States 1-14 (1997) [herein-
after RTNDA Survey]; Ann J. Reavis et at, National Forum on Cameras in the
Courtroom, Cameras in the Courtroom 6-26 (1996) [hereinafter National Forum Sur-
vey]; Kelli L. Sager & Karen N. Frederiksen, Televising the Judicial Branch: In Fur-
therance of the Public's First Amendment Rights, 69 S. Cal. L Rev. 1519, 1521-29
(1996); Thomas H. Tongue & Robert W. Lintott, The Case Against Television in the
Courtroom, 16 Willamette L. Rev. 777, 777-79 (1980); Kathe Aschenbrenner Pate,
Comment, Restricting Electronic Media Coverage of Child-Witnesses: A Proposed
Rule, 1993 U. Chi Legal F. 347, 352-58.
3. See e.g., Chandler, 449 U.S. at 574; Alberto Bernabe-Rietkohll, Prior Re-
straints on the Media and the Right to a Fair Triak A Proposal for a New Standard, 84
Ky. LJ. 259, 260-65 (1995-1996); Christopher K. DeScherer & David L Fogel, Sixth
Amendment at Trial, 84 Geo. LJ. 1222 (1996); Lassiter, The Question, supra note 2, at
938-46; National Forum Survey, supra note 2, at 17-19; Tongue & Lintott, supra note
2, at 794-96; Charles H. Whitebread & Darrell W. Contreras, Free Press v. Fair Tria"
Protecting the Criminal Defendant's Rights in a Highly Publicized Trial by Applying
the Sheppard-Mu'Min Remedy, 69 S. Cal. L Rev. 1587 (1996); Gregory K. McCall,
Note, Cameras in the Criminal Courtroom.: A Sixth Amendment Analysis, 85 Colum.
L. Rev. 1546 (1985); Courtroom Television Network, Facts and Opinions About Cam-
eras in the Courtroom 20 (1995) [hereinafter Court TV]; Christo Lassiter, Put the
Lens Cap Back on Cameras in the Courtroom A Fair Trial is at Stake, 67 Jan N.Y. St.
B.J. 6 (1995) [hereinafter Lassiter, Lens Cap]; Martha White, Fair Trial, Free Press:
Can They Coexist?, Hum. Rts. Fall 1995, at 6.
4. See e.g., Christo Lassiter, TV or Not TV-Statutory Appendix, 86 J. Crim. L
& Criminology 1002, 1011-12 (1996) [hereinafter Lassiter, Appendix]; Pate, supra
note 2, at 363-64; cf. Dyer & Hauserman, supra note 2, at 1686-92; Jennifer Green et
at, Affecting the Rules for the Prosecution of Rape and Other Gender-Based Violence
Before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Feminist Pro-
posal and Critique, 5 Hastings Women's ..J. 171, 205-08 (1994).
5. See, e.g., Electronic Media Coverage of Federal Civil Proceedings: An Evalua-
tion of the Pilot Program in Six District Courts and Two Courts of Appeals, Fed'l Jud.
Center 38, 40-42 (1994) [hereinafter Federal Judicial Center Study]; New York State
Committee to Review Audio Visual Coverage of Court Proceedings, An Open Court-
room: Cameras in New York Courts 1995-97, at 51-56 (1997) [hereinafter New York
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court itself,6 the focus has now expanded to acknowledge the interests
of non-party witnesses.7
This trend has been characterized by a recognition of witnesses' pri-
vacy interests, such as informational privacy (i.e., private facts), safety,
and youth.8 While even non-televised compelled testimony has al-
ways been recognized as having potentially significant privacy implica-
tions,9 broadcast coverage has been seen as particularly invasive.' 0
State Committee Report] (Note that this report is now moot because the New York
State Legislature failed to pass a bill to renew the state's experimental law that al-
lowed trial courts to admit the broadcast media. See Little Things Mean So Much,
Newsday, July 20, 1997, at G03.); Dyer & Hauserman, supra note 2, at 1692-94; Na-
tional Forum Survey, supra note 2, at 34-35; Tongue & Lintott, supra note 2, at 788-90.
6. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 548 (1965) (plurality opinion) (stating
that broadcast poses dangers to the "solemn decorum of court procedure"); Lassiter,
The Question, supra note 2, at 971-72; National Forum Survey, supra note 2, at 33-34;
Tongue & Lintott, supra note 2, at 797-99.
7. See, e.g., Federal Judicial Center Study, supra note 5, at 38-40; New York State
Committee Report, supra note 5, at 56-60; Dyer & Hauserman, supra note 2, at 1685-
86; Tongue & Lintott, supra note 2, at 790-94; McCall, supra note 3, at 1552-54. For
purposes of this Note, "non-party witness" will not include victims in either criminal
or civil trials. Victims and parties would presumably have different interests in the
litigation, and different expectations of privacy, than a witness who is merely circum-
stantially involved in the particular litigation. Because the focus of this Note is on the
interests of these non-party witnesses, the analysis will be equally applicable to both
the civil and criminal context, except to the extent that certain concerns-i.e., retalia-
tory threats to a witness' safety-may arise more frequently in criminal trials.
The focus of this Note is further limited to those situations where the decision al-
lowing a particular trial to be broadcast has already been made, and further, where
adequate procedures are in place for a judge to make this ruling. State rules allowing
camera coverage of trial court procedures necessarily require, either explicitly or im-
plicitly, that the judge make a pre-trial determination that the outcome will not be
materially affected by the coverage, because the Supreme Court requires a fair trial to
remain the court's primary goal. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 574 (1981) ("Tial
courts must be especially vigilant to guard against any impairment of the defendant's
right to a verdict based solely upon the evidence and the relevant law."); Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966) ("The courts must take such steps by rule and
regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences.");
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927):
Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average
man.., to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or
which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between
the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of law.
cited in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 543 (1965) (plurality opinion). Therefore, this
Note will assume that such a finding has been made, and the only concern at issue
here is the witnesses' interests in privacy and related matters.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See, e.g., State v. Green, 395 So. 2d 532, 536 (Fla. 1981) ("We realize that
courtrooms are intimidating and that apprehension accompanies most individuals
who must participate .... This, however, is not a product of electronic media's pres-
ence. Courtrooms were intimidating long before the advent of the electronic me-
dia."); see also Estes, 381 U.S. at 591 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that testifying
"even at its traditional best is a harrowing affair").
10. Dyer & Hauserman, supra note 2, at 1697-98 ("[I]t seems clear, simply by vir-
tue of audience size, that television coverage has a greater impact on participants than
radio or local newspaper coverage . . . ."); see also New York State Committee Re-
WITNESSES AND TELEVISED TRIALS
Witnesses in televised trials may receive more public recognition than
they would in non-televised proceedings." This exposure may leave
them more open to questioning and criticism from members of the
public who watch the trial and, later, recognize the witness." "Since
witnesses... are, in a real sense, simply performing a required public
duty, to subject them to this type of badgering imposes a particularly
invidious form of privacy invasion."' 3
In response to the perception that broadcast coverage of a witness'
testimony invades a witness' privacy rights more than testifying in a
non-broadcast-but open-trial, states are increasingly revising their
rules to require that witnesses' consent be considered when determin-
ing whether to allow broadcasters to televise their testimony.14
Although the intention behind the movement is noble, the effort has
been largely undisciplined. A sparse number of state statutes list fac-
tors for courts to consider before allowing television coverage of a
trial as a whole,'- but most states have provided no guidance on how
the presiding judge should exercise her discretion on the question of
allowing individual witnesses to exempt themselves from coverage.' 6
This lack of guidance is especially troubling in the area of cameras
in the courtroom, because any decision to bar broadcast coverage of a
witness affects the First Amendment rights of the broadcast media.
"Because the gravamen of the claimed injury is the publication of in-
formation.., the dissemination of which is embarrassing or otherwise
painful to an individual, it is here that claims of privacy most directly
confront the constitutional freedoms of speech and press."' 7 The
Court has recognized that when First Amendment rights attach, a gov-
ernment interest in privacy must be compelling, and the means in
place to protect that interest narrowly tailored, before those rights
may be infringed.'8
port, supra note 5, at 41-42 ("[T]elevision is more graphic because it provides the
exact words and demeanor of witnesses and other trial participants .... ")(discussing
testimony of Eleanor Alter, Esq., a matrimonial lawyer, to the New York Committee,
November 12, 1996).
11. Shelly Byron Kulwin, Note, Televised Trials: Constitutional Constraints, Practi-
cal Implications, and State Experimentation, 9 Loy. U. Chla LJ. 910, 917 (1978); Mc-
Call, supra note 3, at 1553-54.
12. Kulwin, supra note 11, at 917.
13. Id.
14. See Lassiter, Appendix, supra note 4, at 1013 ("The trend is to place the exclu-
sion within the discretion of the judges and to permit exclusion of cameras in the
courtroom once the witness proponent has met its assigned burden of proof to show
good cause."); see also infra Part I.A.
15. See, e.g., Cal. Rules of Court: State 980(e)(3) (1997) (listing factors judges
should consider when deciding whether to admit cameras, including, inter alia, privacy
rights of witnesses).
16. See infra Part I.B.
17. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489 (1975).
18. Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989).
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Broadcast has historically received more limited First Amendment
protections than print media.'9 Further, there is no absolute right for
the press-or the public, for that matter-to even attend,20 let alone
broadcast,2 ' trial court proceedings. Nevertheless, a presumption of
openness exists in our trial court system.' Therefore, if a judge has
decided that broadcast coverage will not influence the outcome of a
trial,' and has accordingly admitted the broadcast media, the issue
boils down to pitting a witness' privacy rights against a broadcaster's
First Amendment rights.
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the
question in this context, it has not been silent on the balance of equi-
ties when these two rights collide. In deciding cases involving the pub-
lication of allegedly private facts, 4 the Supreme Court has explicitly
balanced privacy interests against countervailing free press rights.25
The Court has laid down certain minimum levels of protection for
First Amendment rights within which a state may not punish-or pro-
hibit-the publication of sensitive, and arguably private, information.
19. National Forum Survey, supra note 2, at 20; see also Red Lion Broad. Co. v.
F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 386-90 (1969) (discussing the reasons for broadcast media receiv-
ing less First Amendment protections than other media).
20. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 n.18 (1980) (plural-
ity opinion). But see Sager & Frederiksen, supra note 2, at 1529-42 (presenting an
argument that allowing electronic media coverage of judicial proceedings is required
under the First Amendment).
21. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 610 (1978) ("[T]here
is no constitutional right to have [testimony of live witnesses] recorded and
broadcast.").
22. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573.
23. Such a finding would be consistent with several recent studies that indicate-
as even opponents of cameras in the courtroom acknowledge-television coverage
has no significant impact on the outcome of trials. See, e.g., Lassiter, The Question,
supra note 2, at 964-65 ("The results from the state studies were unanimous: the
impact of electronic media coverage of courtroom proceedings, whether civil or crimi-
nal, shows few side effects.") (citing J. Stratton Shartel, Cameras in the Courts: Early
Returns Show Few Side Effects, Inside Litig., at 1, 19 (1993)); see also Sager & Freder-
iksen, supra note 2, at 1544 ("The impact of electronic media coverage of courtroom
proceedings-whether civil or criminal-is virtually nil."); Court TV, supra note 3, at
ii & 4-5 (asserting that "empirical evidence" shows that "24 of the 25 states focusing
on this issue concluded that cameras did not pose a problem regarding jurors and
witnesses"). Federal surveys show similar results. Lassiter, The Question, supra note
2, at 965.
24. See, e.g., Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (finding no liability for
publication of a rape victim's name when the name was obtained from police reports);
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (finding no liability for publication of
a deceased rape victim's name when the name was obtained from court documents
available to the public); see also infra note 131 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 530 (balancing individual's privacy right
against press right to disseminate newsworthy information); Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at
491 (same); see also Gilbert v. Medical Econs. Co., 665 F.2d 305, 307 (10th Cir. 1981)
(same); Virgil v. Tune, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975) (same); infra notes
124-25.
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WITNESSES AND TELEVISED TRIALS
This Note advocates the incorporation of the Supreme Court's pri-
vacy law constitutional standards into this area as guiding principles
for deciding whether to allow witnesses to prevent the broadcast of
their own testimony in trials that are otherwise open to broadcast.
When the testimony is likely to touch on issues that would fall within
the Supreme Court's framework of permissible state privacy protec-
tion, states may allow judges to honor the requests of a witness who
asks that those portions of her testimony not be broadcast. 6 If, how-
ever, the testimony does not concern information that the state has
explicitly deemed "private," or that is recognized as a compelling state
interest, states should not allow judges to prohibit the broadcast of
that witness' testimony, thereby defeating the state policy judgments
that opened the courtroom to broadcast media in the first instance.27
Accordingly, this Note argues that rules allowing judges to bar the
broadcast of a particular non-party witness' testimony in a televised
trial should be narrowly tailored to protect a strong government inter-
est. It concludes that the states should create explicit guidelines to
direct judges' decisions in this area, and that states should look to
their own-or other states'-privacy laws for guidance in this en-
deavor. Part I surveys current state law with regard to witness consent
and cameras in the courtroom, looks at the potential concerns that a
witness may have when she is compelled to testify, and canvasses the
special needs of certain witnesses, such as police informants, under-
cover agents, and children. Part II examines privacy caselaw and how
it attempts to strike a balance between the privacy interests of wit-
nesses and the First Amendment interests of the media. Part II also
considers how concerns about "private facts" differ from other con-
cerns witnesses may have, such as safety and the continued viability of
26. Some states, including New York, have provided judges with the power to or-
der television stations to obscure the identity of witnesses in lieu of completely bar-
ring the broadcast of their testimony. See New York State Committee Report, supra
note 5, at 13-14 & nn.34-39 (discussing New York's use of the so-called "blue dot"
method of obscuring identity). This procedure appears to meet the broadcasters half-
way by allowing them to at least broadcast the audio and the obscured video image of
the witness. Use of the "blue dot" or other obscuring methods presents many of the
same problems of editorial interference as completely prohibiting the broadcast of
witnesses' testimony, see infra Part I1I, and note 106; it is probably the most narrowly
tailored means of protecting substantial state interests, however, when privacy rights
or other interests of witnesses can be adequately protected by simply obscuring their
identity.
27. See, e.g., New York State Committee Report, supra note 5, at 7-17 (examining
arguments supporting the admission of cameras to the courtroom, such as public edu-
cation about and scrutiny of the court system, judicial accountability, cathartic and
deterrent effects, prompting witnesses to come forward, and greater accuracy of news
reports); Lassiter, The Question, supra note 2, at 959-65 (examining arguments sup-
porting cameras in the courtroom); National Forum Survey, supra note 2, at 26-31
(same); Frances Kahn Zemans, Public Access: The Ultimate Guardian of Fairness in
Our Justice System, 79 Judicature 173, 174-75 (1996) (same); Susan E. Harding, Note,
Cameras and the Need for Unrestricted Electronic Media Access to Federal Court-
rooms, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 827, 845-50 (1996) (same).
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ongoing criminal law enforcement investigations. Part III explores
two additional First Amendment concerns that may arise when a state
allows judges unfettered discretion to prevent the broadcast of a par-
ticular witness during a televised trial. This Part first considers how
the doctrine of prior restraints relates to the analysis presented in this
Note; it then focuses on a long-standing rule requiring courts to ab-
stain from making editorial decisions regarding the content of past
and future publications. Part III argues that forbidding the broadcast
of any individual witness in a trial that is otherwise televised is an
editorial judgment and, arguably, a prior restraint, and is therefore
improper for judges to make absent a compelling state interest. Part
IV asserts that states should use the Supreme Court's privacy law ju-
risprudence to guide the exercise of judicial discretion in ordering that
the testimony of individual witnesses not be broadcast. Finally, Part
IV applies this framework to a representative sample of privacy con-
cerns that may arise in televised trials.
I. NON-PARTY WrrN'ssES: STATE LAW AND
POTENTIAL CONCERNS
States have chosen a variety of methods for addressing the concerns
of non-party witnesses in televised trials. This part looks at the multi-
farious rules of court and state statutes that govern the admission of
the broadcast media to state courtrooms, and analyzes the interests
that non-party witnesses may have when their testimony is broadcast.
A. State Law Treatment of Witnesses' Consent/Objection to the
Broadcast of Their Testimony
According to recent surveys of state rules governing cameras in the
courtroom,28 forty-seven states allow some form of broadcast cover-
age of court proceedings.29 This number is misleading, however, be-
cause most states have restrictions that, more often than not, lead to
the exclusion of cameras. For example, three of these states limit tele-
vision coverage to appellate proceedings, where there is no live testi-
mony.30  TWenty-six states have categorical exemptions for trials
28. This part will refer to two recent surveys of the rules relating to cameras in the
courtroom, the National Forum on Cameras in the Courtroom survey, and the Radio
and Television News Director's Association survey, both at supra note 2. Although
some of the state laws used in these surveys have now changed, the surveys are useful
to illustrate the many restrictions already placed on the broadcast media in this
context.
29. See National Forum Survey, supra note 2, at 22-23; RTNDA Survey, supra
note 2, at B-i; Court TV, supra note 3, at 1. States forbidding all broadcast coverage
of court procedures are Indiana, Mississippi, and South Dakota, as well as the District
of Columbia. National Forum Survey, supra note 2, at app. A.; RTNDA Survey, supra
note 2, at B-2. & n.**.
30. These states are Delaware, Illinois, and Louisiana. RTNDA Survey, supra note
2, at B-4. In addition, Nebraska permits only audio coverage of the few trial proceed-
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involving particular subject matter,3' such as juvenile proceedings,
sex crime trials,33 and trials involving trade secrets.' Ten states re-
quire some form of consent from the litigating parties before they will
allow the broadcast of certain types of proceedings.35
The surveys show that seventeen states that allow broadcasters to
air testimonial proceedings currently consider or require some form of
consent from witnesses.' Some of these states employ "rights to ob-
ject," which allow witnesses to make an affirmative showing of good
cause to prevent their testimony from being broadcast, and are, in ef-
fect, implied consent rules-unless a witness shows good cause, they
will be assumed to have consented. 7 Several states also have either
categorical exemptions or presumptions of valid objection to coverage
ings of which it allows electronic media access. Id. at B-3 n.1A. Also, while it allows
trial coverage of civil proceedings, Maryland limits coverage in the criminal context to
appellate proceedings, and has substantial categorical exclusions of the types of civil
trials that may be broadcast. National Forum Survey, supra note 2, at app. A.
31. National Forum Survey, supra note 2, at app. A.
32. The following 18 states limit or prohibit coverage of juvenile proceedings: Al-
abama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Minne-
sota, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Virginia, and Wisconsin. RTNDA Survey, supra note 2, at B-22.
33. The following 14 states limit or prohibit coverage of sex crime trials: Arkan-
sas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. at B-
23.
34. The following eleven states limit or prohibit coverage of trials involving trade
secrets: Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Oregon, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. at B-24.
35. National Forum Survey, supra note 2, at app. A. The following five states
require the consent of a criminal defendant before a trial may be televised: Alabama,
Arkansas, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Tennessee. RTNDA Survey, supra note 2, at B-10.
In addition, Alabama, Arkansas, and Minnesota require the prosecutor's consent in
criminal trials. Id at B-11. The following five states generally require the consent of
the parties in a civil case or a criminal appeal Alabama, Arkansas, Maryland (civil
cases only), and Minnesota (trials), Texas. Id at B-12. Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and
Utah require consent of litigants, in civil cases and criminal appeals, on a more limited
basis. Id. Finally, the following five states require the consent of counsel in civil trials
and all appeals: Alabama, Arkansas, Maryland (civil trials), New York, and Texas. Id.
at B-14.
36. The states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Minne-
sota, Missouri, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Texas, and Utah. RTNDA Survey, supra note 2, at B-15 to B-16; see
also National Forum Survey, supra note 2, at app. A (listing 16 states that required
consent as of January 1, 1996); cf. New York State Committee Report, supra note 5, at
5 & 78-79 (recommending that state judges continue to consider the consent of wit-
nesses as a factor, as they have under an experimental provision allowing cameras in
the courtroom); Katherine H. Flynn, General Provisions: Establish Factors for Courts
to Consider When Determining Whether to Allow Filming or Videotaping in the Court-
room; Allow for Citations When Court Orders Related to Media Cameras in the Court-
room are Violated, 13 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 83, 86 nn.28-29 (1996) (looking at Georgia's
new statute, 1996 Ga. Laws 734, which became effective July 1, 1996and lists the
consent or objection of non-party witnesses as a factor judges must consider).
37. Dyer & Hauserman, supra note 2, at 1656.
172 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66
for certain types of witnesses such as police informants,38 undercover
agents,3 9 relocated witnesses,40 and juveniles.4 Other states require
that the court look at safety concerns of witnesses when considering
television coverage of their testimony.4
Although a growing number of states assign authority to the judge
to exclude cameras when witnesses object,43 only a handful of states
explicitly admonish judges to consider the privacy interests of wit-
nesses.44 While "every state that permits camera coverage requires
that witnesses be shielded when appropriate to protect their safety, to
protect those who are children, and to protect those for whom the
camera will, indeed, pose a particular burden, ' 45 judges are given little
guidance on when these dangers, and risks of privacy infringements,
are sufficiently likely so as to require that cameras be turned off. Bur-
38. New York State Committee Report, supra note 10, at 14; Lassiter, Appendix,
supra note 4, at 1012-13; RTNDA Survey, supra note 2, at B-23. These states are
Arkansas, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Car-
olina, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. RTNDA Survey, supra note 2, at B-15
nn.45-46, B-23.
39. New York State Committee Report, supra note 5, at 14; Lassiter, Appendix,
supra note 4, at 1012-13; RTNDA Survey, supra note 2, at B-24. These states are
Arkansas, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. RTNDA Sur-
vey, supra note 2, at B-15 nn.45-46, B-24.
40. Lassiter, Appendix, supra note 4, at 1012-13; RTNDA Survey, supra note 2, at
B-23. These states are Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico,
North Carolina, and Wisconsin. RTNDA Survey, supra note 2, at B-15 nn.45-46, B-23.
41. New York State Committee Report, supra note 5, at 15-18; Lassiter, Appendix,
supra note 4, at 1012; RTNDA Survey, supra note 2, at B-25. These states are Hawaii,
Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Virginia. RTNDA
Survey, supra note 2, at B-15 n.46, B-16 n.52, B-25.
42. Lassiter, Appendix, supra note 4; see also New York State Committee Report,
supra note 10, at 14 (recommending that New York judges consider witnesses' con-
cerns regarding safety). These states are Arizona, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, New York, and Vermont. Lassiter, Appendix, supra note 4.
43. Lassiter, Appendix, supra note 4, at 1013 (noting the "trend" towards placing
exclusion within the judge's discretion).
44. See, e.g., Lassiter, Appendix, supra note 4, at 1022-23 (listing rules for Alaska
and Arizona which require judges to consider witnesses' privacy); see also Photo-
graphic and Electronic Coverage of the Courts, Me. Rules of Ct., Administrative Or-
ders of the Supreme Judicial Ct., app. A, Rule 1 (requiring judges in Maine to
consider witnesses' privacy); Utah Code of Judicial Adm'n R. 4-401 (April 1, 1997),
Utah Order 97-8, Amendment to Rule 4-401 Media in the Courtroom (requiring
judges in Utah to consider witnesses' privacy); cf. Dyer & Hauserman, supra note 2, at
1655-56 ("Human concerns such as the privacy, emotional well-being, or physical
safety of participants are rarely mentioned as factors judges should consider when
deciding whether to permit electronic coverage.").
It should be noted, however, that many states require a witness' consent before that
witness' testimony may be broadcast; because no inquiry is made into the witness'
reasons for denying consent, privacy rights may still be protected by the witness her-
self. States that require a non-party witness' consent as at least a limited precondition
to broadcast of their testimony are: Alabama, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, New
York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas (civil), and Utah.
RTNDA Survey, supra note 2, at B-15 to B-16.
45. Court TV, supra note 23, at 5.
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dens of proof for exemptions are often unclear, and many states sim-
ply grant judges broad discretion to exempt individuals, and fail to
provide criteria for evaluating privacy issues.'
B. Potential Concerns for Witnesses Whose Testimony May
be Broadcast
Witnesses may have a wide variety of reasons for wanting to pre-
vent the broadcast of their trial testimony. Although some commen-
tators have suggested that a flat rule be adopted requiring the judge to
exempt all witnesses who object to coverage,47 or for those who can
show "good cause,"' most states have simply allowed judges the dis-
cretion to consider any reason a witness may proffer. 9 This section
first analyzes the private facts concerns raised by testimony that is
broadcast; it then examines more commonly recognized witness con-
cerns, such as protecting a witness' safety and preserving the integrity
of ongoing criminal investigations.
1. Private Facts and Anonymity
Non-party witnesses generally have a less direct interest in the sub-
ject of a trial than a party, victim, or defendant;50 yet courts may call
upon these very witnesses to testify about intimate, personal details of
their lives.51 Moreover, most witnesses would probably prefer to
avoid exposure in the press.' They may be subpoenaed to testify,
however, and therefore cannot protect themselves from this
exposure.53
The nature of broadcasting may itself be seen as an additional inva-
sion of privacy. Television presents a witness' own voice and image,
46. Dyer & Hauserman, supra note 2, at 1669. Many states allow judges to ex-
empt witnesses from coverage for "good cause," Lassiter, Appendix, supra note 4, at
1013 & n.62 (Hawaii, Iowa, Mdissouri, New Mexico, North Dakota, Vermont, Wiscon-
sin, and Wyoming ("for cause")), or because such a ruling would serve the "interests
of justice," Lassiter, Appendix, supra note 4, at 1013 & n.62 (Alaska and Connecti-
cut). These terms are seldom defined.
47. Nancy T. Gardner, Note, Cameras in the Courtroom" Guidelines for State
Criminal Trials, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 475, 497 (1985).
48. Dyer & Hauserman, supra note 2, at 1697.
49. See supra note 46.
50. Scott M. Matheson, Jr., The Prosecutor, The Press, and Free Speech, 58 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 865, 884 (1990). Privacy concerns may be stronger in some cases than
others. For a compelling account of the need to acknowledge and guard privacy con-
cerns in the context of the sexual crimes of war, see Green et al., supra note 4, at 207-
08 (suggesting the use of in camera proceedings to protect the privacy interests of
victims and witnesses-to prevent the "detrimental psychological impact of a public
hearing").
51. Kulwin, supra note 11, at 918.
52. Matheson, supra note 50, at 884.
53. Id.
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which some argue removes the last "shield of privacy." 4 For this rea-
son, several courts have found privacy interests to be sufficiently com-
pelling to justify prohibiting the broadcast of a trial in toto.55 This is
more frequent than might be suggested by the small number of states
that require judges to look at the privacy interests of witnesses when
considering whether to admit electronic media to a trial. 6
Many of the arguments for protecting privacy, however, exaggerate
the magnitude of the exposure of private information in the trial set-
ting. For example, Christo Lassiter states, "As a general rule, we do
not allow television cameras in medical operating rooms or bed-
rooms.... Courtrooms are no different. Like an operating room, the
business of criminal trials is quite serious, like bedrooms, much of
what makes the events interesting is quite private. ' 57 While clearly
using hyperbole to illustrate his point, Lassiter fails to acknowledge
the vast difference between observing first hand enormously private
events, like a medical operation, and hearing (and viewing via televi-
sion) important and relevant testimony about such events. Moreover,
this argument ignores the relevance of the judiciary's position as a
branch of the government,58 that trials are, by long-standing tradition,
public events, and that the public relies on the press to observe and
report on such government proceedings.5 9 Nevertheless, the issue of a
witness' privacy is one that has drawn increasing attention, and is con-
54. McCall, supra note 3, at 1553; see also supra note 10 and accompanying text
(discussing the view that broadcast is more invasive of privacy than other forms of
media). There are those, however, who do not find this to be a persuasive perspec-
tive. In James L. Hoyt, Prohibiting Courtroom Photography: It's Up to the Judge in
Florida and Wisconsin, 63 Judicature 290 (1980), the author quotes a memorandum
that indicates that at least one state requires witnesses to show cause before the can-
eras may be turned off for them, precisely because the state does not honor an objec-
tion to the camera itself:
Cause... is intended to require that there be some reasonable basis other
than the desire not to be photographed to justify prohibiting the photograph-
ing of a participant. Cause may include a reasonable fear of physical harm,
the protection of a minor's reputation, a reasonable fear of undue embar-
rassment, or the like.
Id. at 294 (quoting Beilfuss, CJ., Memo to All Wisconsin Judges, "Standards on Use
of Audio or Visual Equipment in the Courtrooms" (April 21, 1978) (emphasis
added)).
55. DeScherer & Fogel, supra note 3, at 1226 & n.1986 (citing the following cases:
United States v. Jones, 965 F.2d 1507, 1513 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. De Los
Santos, 810 F.2d 1326, 1333 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)); Gardner, supra note 47, at
489.
56. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
57. Lassiter, Lens Cap, supra note 3, at 11.
58. Ruth A. Strickland & Richter H. Moore, Jr., Cameras in State Courts: A His-
torical Perspective, 78 Judicature 128, 160 (1994) ("The courtroom is not sacrosanct; it
belongs to the people just as any part of government does."); see also infra notes 150-
51 and accompanying text.
59. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975) (noting the public's
reliance on the press to monitor and report on government operations).
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sidered by most to be a valid concern requiring a response from the
court system.
2. Safety
There are numerous potential safety concerns that may face certain
witnesses if their testimony is televised. Special provisions are often
made for witnesses who are police informants,60 undercover police of-
ficers,61 and relocated witnesses.62 All of these witnesses may face a
threat of physical harm, not only from those against whom they are
testifying, but also from others who may recognize them. Inmate-wit-
nesses who testify regarding jailhouse crimes may also face the pros-
pect of physical danger-from their fellow inmates-if their testimony
is aired.63 In a similar vein, the state likely has a compeln interest in
protecting a witness' safety if an assailant is still at large.
Other witnesses may fear harassment by members of their commu-
nities. The Supreme Court has recognized this fear as a legitimate
concern when considering the propriety of allowing cameras in the
courtroom.6 Similar fears have led courts to close trials to spectators
as well as the electronic media.6
3. Criminal Law Enforcement
Many witnesses involved in criminal law enforcement must also be
protected: undercover police officers involved in ongoing undercover
operations, police informants, and relocated witnesses.67 Restricting
access to such testimony is primarily intended to protect the anonym-
ity required to maintain the integrity of continuing criminal investiga-
tions.18 For example, an undercover officer who investigates drug
operations may fear that by testifying she will expose her identity to
the public, thereby jeopardizing the integrity of her ongoing covert
60. See supra note 38.
61. See supra note 39.
62. See supra note 40.
63. See, e.g., State v. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., 395 So. 2d 544, 549 (Fla. 1981)
(stating that a bare assertion of fear of reprisal by an inmate-witness in a jail-house
murder trial may, in some cases, be enough to justify exclusion of the broadcast media
during that witness' testimony).
64. Sean M. Scott, The Hidden First Amendment Values of Privacy, 71 Wash. L
Rev. 683, 706 (1996).
65. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532,547 (1965) (plurality opinion) (noting that harass-
ment by pranksters may be difficult to prove).
66. See, e.g., People v. Hagan, 248 N.E.2d 588 (N.Y. 1969) (closing the courtroom
to spectators because a witness feared reprisal for testifying against alleged murderers
of Malcolm X).
67. See supra notes 60-62.
68. Dyer & Hauserman, supra note 2, at 1686; see also Robin Zeidel, Note, Clos-
ing the Courtroom for Undercover Police Witnesses: New York Must Adopt a Consis-
tent Standard, 4 J.L. & Pol'y 659, 660-62 (1996) (explaining the perceived need for
anonymity for undercover officers in order to ensure their safety and the integrity of
their undercover operations).
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investigations of the defendant's friends or family-people who are
likely to watch the trial.69 Thus, a judge may wish to prohibit the
broadcast of this agent's testimony, in order to preserve the agent's
other criminal investigations. Four states have statutes that permit
judges to bar cameras for this type of testimony,70 while other states
have similar provisions in their judicial codes governing cameras in
the courtroom. 7' At least one commentator urges the adoption of a
per se rule requiring courts to be closed to both the press and the
public for these witnesses.'
4. Children
States have long felt a special obligation to protect child witnesses
from exposure to the press and public. "A child witness is not a mini-
ature version of an adult witness.... They have vulnerabilities, needs
and limitations not found among adult witnesses.17 3 Moreover, be-
cause of their minority, children are not capable of giving meaningful
consent to having their testimony televised.74 Even the Supreme
Court has stated that protecting minors constitutes a compelling gov-
ernment interest for purposes of satisfying strict scrutiny. 5
69. Zeidel, supra note 68, at 660-61 (discussing the concerns of undercover agents
investigating drug operations who must testify against drug defendants). Of course,
this concern would be present even if the testimony is not broadcast, because the
same people may attend a trial, and see the officer in person. It seems reasonable to
assume, however, that if the people are in fact involved in illegal drug operations, they
will not want to associate themselves with the defendant by attending a trial. They
would not, however, risk such association by viewing the broadcast of the trial in the
privacy of their own homes. In this way, broadcast coverage has a different impact on
this witness than other forms of media. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text;
infra note 86 and accompanying text.
70. Lassiter, Appendix, supra note 4, at 1012.
71. For a complete list, see supra notes 38-40. This type of witness would be a
good candidate for the "blue dot" compromise struck in New York. See supra note
26. The witness' primary concern is in the protection of her identity, not in the pri-
vacy of her testimony. Thus, even though the state has a valid interest in protecting
the witness, the option of simply obscuring her face may mean that cameras need not
be turned off entirely.
72. James F. Fagan, Jr., Close that Door! Closure of Courtroom During Testimony
of an Undercover Police Officer, 26 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 619, 636-39 (1992).
73. Pate, supra note 2, at 360 (quoting Ellen Matthews & Karen Sayowitz, Child
Victim Witness Manual, 12 Cal. Center for Jud. Educ. and Res. J. 1, 7 (Winter/Spring
1992)).
74. Pate, supra note 2, at 361-62.
75. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982). In order to
pass "strict scrutiny" review by a court, the government must demonstrate a compel-
ling state interest in regulating an activity, and a narrowly tailored means of effectuat-
ing that interest. See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101-02 (1979)
(applying strict scrutiny in a case involving First Amendment rights); Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976) (same); Organization for a Better Austin v.
Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (same); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931)(same).
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States have addressed concerns about child witnesses by adopting
rules requiring that the public be excluded from matters involving
juveniles, such as family court7 6 and juvenile court proceedings. 7
Many commentators urge all states to adopt rules protecting minors
from television coverage.7'
5. Psychological Effects on Witnesses
Even in its earliest case dealing with cameras in the courtroom, Es-
tes v. Texas,7 9 the Supreme Court was concerned with the psychologi-
cal impact of cameras on witnesses. The Court expressed its concern
about a wide range of possible psychological effects, including fear,
embarrassment, and memory loss, as well as reactions of witnesses to
the camera, such as boastfulness and insincerity.80 The Court noted
that these responses could impede the fact-finding process.8'
The same pressure that may result in these adverse side effects,
however, has also long been seen as an important means of obtaining
the truth. For instance, knowing that many people could be watching
may make a witness less likely to stretch the truth.8s  Moreover, at
least one Supreme Court justice has noted that broadcasting trials
may improve the quality of testimony by moving all the trial partici-
pants to perform their duties more conscientiouslys 3 Witnesses may,
in other words, feel more accountable for their actions.84
76. States prohibiting coverage of adoption proceedings are: Alaska, Arizona, Ar-
kansas, Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Missouri, North Carolina, Maryland, Ore-
gon, Rhode Island, and Virginia. RTNDA Survey, supra note 2, at B-19 to B-21.
States prohibiting coverage of child custody proceedings are: Alaska, Arkansas
(guardianship), Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri,
New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island (if minor is a participant), Penn-
sylvania, and Virginia. Id States prohibiting coverage of divorce proceedings are:
Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id
77. These states are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa,
Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ore-
gon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin. New York State Committee
Report, supra note 5, at 15-18; RTNDA Survey, supra note 2, at B-22.
78. See, e.g. National Forum Survey, supra note 2, at 42 (recommending that states
"not allow minors ... or child witnesses to be televised"); Pate, supra note 2, 367
(advocating the adoption of a binding rule of court prohibiting television coverage of
a minor's testimony in all court proceedings).
79. 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (plurality opinion).
80. ld at 547 ("Some may be demoralized and frightened, some cocky and given
to overstatement; memories may falter, as with anyone speaking publicly, and accu-
racy of statement may be severely undermined. Embarrassment may impede the
search for the truth, as may a natural tendency toward overdramatization.").
81. Id.
82. 6 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence § 1834, at 435-36 (J. Chadboum rev., 1976)
(stating that publicity "produces in the witness' mind a disinclination to falsify").
83. See, e.g, Estes, 381 U.S. at 583 (Warren, J., concurring).
84. Paul Thaler, The Watchful Eye, American Justice in the Age of the Television
Trial 116 (1994).
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Nevertheless, states have recognized the negative impact that pub-
licly broadcast testimony might have on witnesses,85 and such con-
cerns will likely persist. This perceived impact is often thought to be
compounded by the addition of a television camera to the already
high-pressure atmosphere of the trial: "One only has to see a tele-
vised football game. All the fans come to see the game but the game
is forgotten immediately and their attention is captured by the cam-
era, as soon as they find that they are on television. 86 Such argu-
ments propel debate about the merits of cameras in the courtroom.
a. Examples of Psychological Effects
The most commonly recognized psychological effects that broadcast
coverage is thought to have on witnesses relate largely to the way a
witness will testify in the presence of a television camera. Another
concern is that witnesses will be reluctant to come to court if they
think their testimony may be televised. The next part summarizes the
various potential psychological effects.87
85. See, e.g., United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 1983) (up-
holding a per se ban on cameras in federal courtrooms as a sustainable time, place
and manner restriction, stating in conclusory fashion that cameras could have a nega-
tive impact on witnesses); In re Photographic and Electronic Coverage of Courts, 8
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1556, 1558-59 (Me. 1982) (discussing possible negative impact
of electronic coverage); In re Post-Newsweek Stations Florida, Inc., 370 So. 2d 764,
775 (Fla. 1979) (outlining psychological effects of television coverage on trial partici-
pants); see also, Lassiter, Lens Cap, supra note 3, at 9 ("Cameras in the courtroom
have a 'chilling effect' on witnesses and other participants.").
86. Judge Nauman Scott of the Western District of Louisiana, quoted in Laralyn
M. Sasaki, Note, Electronic Media Access to Federal Courtrooms: A Judicial Re-
sponse, 23 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 769, 789 (Summer 1990). It is important to recognize
the difference, however, between a game and a trial: a courtroom has a judge control-
ling the proceedings and directing the behavior of trial participants. Cf. Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966) ("The carnival atmosphere at trial could easily have
been avoided since the courtroom and courthouse premises are subject to the control
of the court."); Court TV, supra note 3, at 6 ("[T]he judge has the responsibility and
authority to control courtroom decorum regardless of the presence of cameras.").
Moreover, witnesses are not merely watching others "play," but are themselves active
participants, trying to listen, respond to questions, and follow instructions. It would
take a mentally dexterous witness to be able to do all this and still manage to "ham it
up" for the camera.
87. These reactions to testifying implicate more than the interests of the witness,
because they have a direct impact on the effectiveness, and perhaps even the veracity,
of the witness' testimony. See McCall, supra note 3, at 1554 ("These camera-induced
alterations in demeanor may, in turn, affect the factfinder's evaluation of the witness'
testimony." (emphasis added)). For purposes of this Note, however, it is assumed that
the judge has already decided that the effect of the camera at trial-in contrast to the
pressures of testifying that are present even without the camera-will be insubstan-
tial; therefore, the focus here is on witnesses' concerns. See supra note 7 (setting forth
the limits on the scope of this Note).
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i. Nerves/Fear
Many commentators consider the intimidation of witnesses a nega-
tive psychological effect of having cameras in the courtroom. 8s It is
recognized widely that witnesses may be tense or nervous about testi-
fying. 89 This may be particularly true if witnesses are asked to reveal
personally embarrassing information.90 Some critics of cameras in the
courtroom, pointing to "socio-psychological studies," contend that the
loss of anonymity due to the broadcast makes it more likely that a
witness will alter his or her testimony to conform to popular beliefs in
order to "avoid public ostracism."9' Also troubling to many observers
is that, for some witnesses, anxiety may cause them to "ham[ ] it up"
for the cameras, thereby undermining their credibility. 92
Many argue, however, that the witnesses' uneasiness is due to the
inherent pressures of trial testimony, rather than to the camera itself.
"There is no evidence that [the nervousness of some witnesses in high-
profle cases] is related to the camera, or that they would be less ner-
vous in the presence of the judge, jury, defendant and three dozen
furiously-scribbling reporters. 93 Moreover, a simple remedy to the
problem of witnesses who act up when nervous is for the presiding
judge to instruct witnesses not to play to the camera.94 In any event,
the overall effect of this phenomenon may be minimal, because "for
every person who shows off, usually to his or her detriment, there are
others who will be on their best behavior." 95
ii. Honesty/Accuracy
Perhaps as a result of the intimidation witnesses feel knowing their
testimony will be broadcast, some commentators and courts contend
that "witnesses may alter their story to accommodate a television au-
dience."96 The problem may be particularly acute in high-profile tri-
als, which are likely to garner the greatest degree of media attention.
88. Jonathan NL Remshak, Truth, Justice and the Media: An Analysis of the Pub-
lic Criminal Trial, 6 Seton Hall Const. IU. 1083, 1084 (1996); see also Dyer & Hauser-
man, supra note 2, at 1672 ("The intimidating effect may be significant.").
89. National Forum Survey, supra note 2, at 32.
90. New York State Committee Report, supra note 5, at 4 ("Some witnesses in
civil proceedings may reasonably fear injury to their personal or professional reputa-
tion if certain aspects of their past are thrust before a television audience.").
91. McCall, supra note 3, at 1553 (citation omitted).
92. National Forum Survey, supra note 2, at 32; see also supra note 87.
93. Court TV, supra note 23, at 5; see also State v. Green, 395 So. 2d 532,536 (Fla.
1981) (noting that courtrooms filled with spectators, including media, are intimidating
even without a camera, and the camera does not add to the tension already present).
94. National Forum Survey, supra note 2, at 43. Of course, the fact that a judge
has instructed a witness not to act up is no guarantee that that witness will comply. It
would be peculiar, however, to bar the broadcast of a trial due to an assumption that
the judge's explicit orders would not be obeyed.
95. New York State Committee Report, supra note 5, at 2.
96. Lassiter, Lens Cap, supra note 3, at 7.
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When a witness in a highly publicized and televised trial must testify
about embarrassing or traumatic personal experiences, "the accuracy
of that testimony may be jeopardized." 97
This point, however, is also contested, as noted above.98 Some com-
mentators assert that rather than inhibit truthful testimony, broadcast
coverage of a trial will actually encourage candor.99
iii. Not Coming Forward/Failure to Testify
Whether or not a witness is actually fearful or anxious, she may,
nevertheless, be reluctant to testify while the cameras are rolling. For
example, in the criminal context:
[O]ne of the serious problems of law enforcement is that many per-
sons who witness crimes do not want to "get involved," particularly
if they live or work in the area so as to be subject to retaliation.
This problem easily could be compounded by the realization of
these persons that "to get involved" may result in the televising of
their testimony. 100
The dilemma is not unique to criminal trials, however; some com-
mentators believe the problem has less to do with the subject matter
of the testimony than with the broadcast itself. A witness may be re-
luctant to testify simply because a trial is televised; if so, the trial pro-
cess may be fettered, and the search for the truth interrupted. 1 1 This
reluctance may have its strongest effect on those who have not been
called to testify, but would have come forward on their own if not for
the presence of the electronic media."°
Once again, however, there is disagreement about the extent-and
even the existence-of this problem. Wigmore represents the view of
those who see mass media exposure as a means of ensuring that all
potential witnesses are made aware of the proceedings: "[Publicity]
secures the presence of those who by possibility may be able to fur-
nish testimony in chief or to contradict falsifiers and yet may not have
97. McCall, supra note 3, 1553; see also New York State Committee Report, supra
note 5, at 72 ("Where the witness' testimony is highly personal in nature, concerns
were voiced that the presence of cameras will make it more difficult for witnesses to
tell their story fully and honestly.").
98. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
99. Ia; cf. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979) (asserting that
openness in court proceedings aids in the search for the truth, and inspires witnesses
and other trial participants to perform their functions more conscientiously); United
States v. Cojab, 996 F.2d 1404, 1407 (2d Cir. 1993) (same).
100. Tongue & Lintott, supra note 2, at 791; see also New York State Committee
Report, supra note 5, at 38 (reporting the belief that "there is a 'significant risk' that
cameras will have a chilling effect on a victim or a witness' willingness to report a
crime or testify in court").
101. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 547 (1965) (plurality opinion).
102. McCall, supra note 3, at 1554 ("The presence of cameras may ... deter some
witnesses from coming forward at all.").
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been known beforehand to the parties to possess any information."" °
Thus, the wider the media exposure, the better the chances for achiev-
ing a full accounting of the facts.
b. Are Potential Psychological Effects Really a Problem?
There are indications that the fear of any psychological impact of
cameras on witnesses is much exaggerated. The conclusion of a Fed-
eral Judicial Center study of cameras in federal civil courts, examining
reports and conclusions of twelve states, indicates that most trial par-
ticipants believe broadcast coverage has little or no detrimental effect
on those participants. 104 Proponents of cameras in the courtroom ar-
gue that the various states that have studied these potential effects
have found that witnesses behave the same regardless of the presence
of a camera. 0 5 For example, the April 1997 report of the New York
State Committee to Review Audio Visual Coverage of Court Proceed-
ings concluded that "witness intimidation is neither borne out by the
record in New York nor sufficiently strong to warrant barring cameras
from the courtroom across-the-board."' 1 6 Indeed, even the Supreme
Court has noted that whether there is in fact any psychological impact
on the participants of a trial is, at the very least, debatable."17
To the extent that psychological effects of broadcast coverage are
real, however, they are likely to overlap with privacy concerns. For
example, assume a witness expresses a fear that she will not be able to
accurately testify because she is nervous due to the camera's presence.
In order to even reach the stage at which the judge must decide
whether privacy concerns require the camera be turned off, the judge
must have already decided that the witness' fear will not have a signif-
icant impact on her testimony.'08 Thus, the real consideration for the
judge is whether the state protects witnesses with a fear of cameras.
This is, in essence, a question of the privacy interests of the witness:
does the state recognize a right to privacy for witnesses who fear cam-
eras such that the witness should be allowed to defeat the state's pol-
103. 6 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence § 1834, at 436 (J. Chadbourn Rev., 1976).
104. Federal Judicial Center Study, supra note 5, at 7; see also Court TV, supra note
23, at 5.
105. Court TV, supra note 23, at 4-5.
106. New York State Committee Report, supra note 5, at 73. The New York State
Committee Report also recognized that devices that block the face of the witness,
while allowing television viewers to see the witness' mannerisms and to hear her
voice, have been used by several states, and may present a useful compromise be-
tween the rights of the witness and the rights of the public to observe trials, vis-a-vis
the press. See eg., New York State Committee Report, supra note 5, at 13-14 (dis-
cussing use of the "blue dot" technique of obscuring identity of testifying witness); see
also supra note 26.
107. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 578 (1981).
108. See supra note 7 (discussing the necessity of the judge's pre-trial determination
that the camera will not effect the trial processes).
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icy judgments that allow the camera in the courtroom in the first
place?
Part III of this note argues that this question must be answered by
looking to the Supreme Court's decisions in the area of privacy law,
and developing explicit state guidelines that direct judicial discretion
in prohibiting the broadcasting of a witness' testimony.
I. STATE AND SUPREME COURT TREATMENT OF INFORMATIONAL
PRIVACY CONCERNS
States have traditionally protected the privacy rights of their citi-
zens by allowing private causes of action. °9 The Supreme Court only
fairly recently become involved in privacy law jurisprudence.'10 This
part briefly analyzes the major Supreme Court cases dealing with pri-
vate facts causes of action, and examines the traditional approach to
privacy law that states have taken. Although privacy law jurispru-
dence relates to post-publication causes of action, this part argues that
these approaches may be translated into the pre-publication questions
relevant to non-party witnesses in televised trials.
A. The Supreme Court's Approach to Privacy Law: Strict Scrutiny
The Supreme Court has not thoroughly explored the area of private
facts causes of action, leaving this area for the states to flesh out."'
The few constitutional rules that the Court has established, however,
have informed the states' formulation of private facts jurispru-
dence,"12 and are vital to the present analysis.
First, the Court has recognized a state's legitimate interest in pro-
tecting privacy." 3 The Court has allowed states to protect this interest
by providing a cause of action for invasion of privacy when the media
publicly discloses private facts." 4 In a series of decisions, however,
the Supreme Court has established that such a cause of action must be
narrowly drawn to minimize its infringement of free speech." 5 This
109. Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 117, at 850-51 (5th ed. 1984); Pros-
ser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 386 (1960).
110. The Supreme Court first addressed the privacy cause of action in the 1936 case
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). Lorelei Van Wey, Note, Private
Facts Tort The End is Here, 52 Ohio St. L.J. 299, 302 (1991).
111. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532 (1989) (noting that the Court's
cases have "carefully eschewed" reaching any constitutional decision on whether the
prohibition or punishment of the publication of true facts could ever be consistent
with the First Amendment).
112. See infra Part II.B.
113. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 533 (noting that "press freedom and privacy rights
are both 'plainly rooted in the traditions and significant concerns of our society .... "
(quoting Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975)) (emphasis added)).
114. Id.
115. For a detailed account of the Supreme Court's cases in this area, see Van Wey,
supra note 110, at 303-12 (discussing, in this order, the following series of Supreme
Court cases: Cox Broad., 420 U.S. 469; Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,
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means state rules establishing the cause of action must recognize lia-
bility only when such liability is necessary to further a compelling state
interest.
The Supreme Court has further recognized that the necessary bal-
ancing between a state's legitimate interest in protecting privacy and
the free speech rights involved in publication requires state rules in
this area to take a case-by-case approach. 16 In this way, the Court
attempts to minimize the infringement on free speech-the unavoida-
ble result of such a cause of action. Thus, even when a state interest is
important enough to allow some encroachment on First Amendment
rights, if the remedy suppresses more speech than necessary, the
Supreme Court regularly condemns it as an overbroad protection of
that interest.117
Also relevant to this analysis is the Supreme Court's decision to
place the responsibility with states to prevent the public disclosure of
information contained in official government documents, rather than
permitting states to punish the publication of that private informa-
tion. 18 This tactic further illustrates the Court's reluctance to inter-
fere with the media's use of publicly available information.
In sum, if a state wishes to protect privacy through a cause of action
for its invasion, the cause of action must fit within a strict set of pa-
rameters laid out by the Supreme Court. First, in order for courts to
adequately analyze the sufficiency of the claim, the state must clearly
articulate the interest in privacy that the cause of action is intended to
protect. Additionally, the state interest in privacy must be a compel-
ling one and the means used to protect that interest must be narrowly
drawn, encroaching as little as possible on free speech rights. Finally,
435 U.S. 829 (1978); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Globe News-
paper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Florida Star, 491 U.S. 524); see also
Karen Rhodes, Note, Open Court Proceedings and Privacy Law: Re-examining the
Bases for the Privilege, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 881, 888-90 (1996) (discussing the Supreme
Court's cases involving causes of action for invasion of privacy).
116. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 539 (noting the "impermissibility of categorical
prohibitions upon media access where important First Amendment interests are at
stake").
117. See, e.g., id. at 532 (striking down a statute prohibiting publication of rape
victims' names); Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 106 (striking down a statute prohibiting publi-
cation, without written approval of the juvenile court, of the name of a youth charged
as a juvenile offender); Landmark Communications, 435 U.S. at 838 (striking down a
statute prohibiting publication of confidential proceedings against state judges);
Oklahoma Publ'g, 430 U.S. at 311-12 (striking down a statute that prohibited publica-
tion of the name of a juvenile charged with a crime); Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at 497
(striking down statute prohibiting publication of a rape victim's name). But cf. Hus-
key v. NBC, 632 F. Supp. 1282, 1295 (N.D. Ill 1986) (finding that an injunction
against showing footage of a particular plaintiff (not in a witnessltrial situation) would
be narrowly tailored to serve plaintiff's privacy interest without unduly infringing First
Amendment rights).
118. Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at 496; see also infra notes 166-67 and accompanying
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the facts of each case must be analyzed, and a compelling state inter-
est be established, before liability may be found.
The Supreme Court has also stated that a claim to privacy is dimin-
ished when the information pertains to a public trial.119 It has further
ruled that a state may not generally penalize the publication of infor-
mation contained in public court documents, or stated in open
court.12 0 These decisions favor allowing the press a "free hand" with
the broadcast of witness testimony.12 1
Some Supreme Court rulings, however, support a more limited right
to the broadcast of witness testimony. In one such ruling, mentioned
above, the Court made states responsible for preventing the public
disclosure of information in this context; states may not wait and pun-
ish the publication of such material. 22 When judges prohibit the
broadcast of one witness' testimony, however, in a trial otherwise
open to broadcasters, they are not preventing the disclosure of the
private information. This is because other media may publish the pri-
vate information, and because it is, by definition, "public" information
if it is stated in open court.' 3
The next section will show how these basic tenets, laid out by the
Supreme Court, have influenced the way states have tailored their
protections of privacy.
B. States' Approach to Privacy Law: The Second Restatement
of Torts
The large majority of states protect privacy interests of individuals
by providing a common law or statutory cause of action for the publi-
119. See, e.g., Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at 493 (quoting with approval Warren & Bran-
deis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 216-17 (1890) ("[T]he right to privacy
is not invaded by any publication made in a court of justice .... ")); see also infra
notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
120. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. 524; Daily Mail, 443 U.S. 97; Landmark Communi-
cations, 435 U.S. 829; Oklahoma Publ'g, 430 U.S. 308; Cox Broad., 420 U.S. 469. But
cf. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 610 (1978) (holding that trial
court could properly deny the media's request to make copies of tapes played in open
court).
121. Cf. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) ("[W]here there was 'no
threat or menace to the integrity of the trial,' ... we have consistently required that
the press have a free hand ... .") (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 377 (1947)).
122. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
123. Of course, many see an additional privacy "invasion" presented by the actual
broadcast of the testimony, see supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text, as opposed
to the mere reporting of the information about which the witness testified. This pri-
vacy interest, however, is certainly not more weighty than those privacy interests al-
ready recognized by the states and may, in fact, be less weighty, see infra note 188 and
accompanying text (analyzing protections-and the lack thereof-for a person's vis-
ual image when it is electronically recorded in a public place). Therefore, the privacy
concern raised by the nature of broadcast itself is analyzed here as simply another
privacy interest that may enter into the judge's calculations-and not one that carries
any more weight than any other personal privacy interest.
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cation of private facts about a person. 24 These rules are frequently
modeled after the invasion of privacy tort outlined in the Restatement
of Torts.'~ Such a cause of action typically requires a showing that
the disclosure was highly offensive to a person of reasonable sensibili-
ties and was of no legitimate public concern.' This contemplates
protection for "intimate physical details the publicizing of which
would be not merely embarrassing and painful but deeply shocking to
the average person subjected to such exposure." 1 7 Examples of pro-
124. See, e.g., Forsher v. Bugliosi, 608 P.2d 716,725 (CaL 1980) (recognizing a cause
of action for invasion of privacy); Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 189 A.2d 773, 774
(DeL 1963) (same); Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243,248 (Fla. 1944) (same); Cabaniss
v. Hipsley, 151 S.E.2d 496,500 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966) (same); Beaumont v. Brown, 257
N.W.2d 522,527 (Mich. 1977) (same), overruled on other grounds, Bradley v. Board of
Educ., 565 N.W.2d 650, 658 (Mich. 1997); see also infra note 125. Some states, how-
ever, have no cause of action for the public disclosure of private facts. See, e.g., Estate
of Benson v. Minnesota Bd. of Med. Practice, 526 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995) (noting that Minnesota does not recognize a separate cause of action for inva-
sion of privacy, but that these claims may be brought as personal injury causes of
action); Howell v. New York Post Co., 612 N.E.2d 699, 703 (N.Y. 1993) (rejecting
common law cause of action for invasion of privacy, concluding the legislature is bet-
ter equipped to design such a cause of action); Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711, 714 (N.C.
1988) (rejecting cause of action for private facts invasion of privacy as inconsistent
with First Amendment protections of free speech). Nevertheless, because no particu-
lar set of privacy protection guidelines is necessary to effectuate the goals of the Note,
it is irrelevant that some states have no cause of action in this area.
125. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1976) [hereinafter Restatement]; see,
e.g., Beard v. Akzona, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 128, 131 (E.D. Tenn. 1981) (explicitly and
favorably referring to the Restatement version of private facts tort when discussing its
own state's formulation of the privacy cause of action); Ozer v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371,
377 (Colo. 1997) (en banc) (same); Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American,
Inc., 448 A.2d 1317, 1329 (Conn. 1982) (same); State of Hawai'i Org. of Police Of-
ficers v. Society of Prof'l Journalists-Univ. of Hawai'i Chapter, 927 P.2d 386, 406
(Haw. 1996) (same); Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900, 901 (IML App. Ct. 1990)
(same); Near E. Side Community Org. v. Hair, 555 N.E.2d 1324, 1334-35 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1990) (same); Fmlay v. Finlay, 856 P.2d 183, 189 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993) (same);
Household Fm. Corp. v. Bridge, 250 A.2d 878, 882-83 (Md. 1969) (same); Corcoran v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 572 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Mo. CL App. 1978) (same); Board
of Dentistry v. Kandarian, 886 P.2d 954, 957 (Mont. 1994) (same); Montesano v.
Donrey Media Group, 668 P.2d 1081, 1084-85 (Nev. 1983) (same); Moore v. Sun
Publ'g Corp., 881 P.2d 735, 743 (N.M. CL App. 1994) (same); Killilea v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 499 N.E.2d 1291, 1294 (Ohio CL App. 1985) (same); Curran v. Children's
Serv. Ctr. of Wyoming County, Inc., 578 A.2d 8, 12 (Pa. Super. CL 1990) (same);
Industrial Found. of the S. v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 682-83 &
n.21 (Tex. 1976) (same); Zinda v. Louisiana Pac. Corp., 440 N.W.2d 548, 555 (Wis.
1989) (same). Note that even when a state does not explicitly refer to the Restate-
ment, its formulation of the cause of action may nevertheless overlap or follow the
Restatement.
126. See Restatement, supra note 125, § 652D (a) & (b). For an example of how
this analysis works in practice, see Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232
(7th Cir. 1993).
127. Haynes, 8 F.3d at 1234-35 (emphasis added); see also Gilbert v. Medical Econs.
Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1981) ("In our view, this standard properly restricts
liability for public disclosure of private facts to the extreme case, thereby providing
the breathing space needed by the press to properly exercise effective editorial
judgment.").
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tected information include sexual relations, family problems, issues
concerning a person's home life, socially ostracizing diseases, and inti-
mate personal correspondences. 28
The Restatement implicitly recognizes the important free speech
rights implicated by overprotecting privacy interests of peculiarly sen-
sitive persons. 129 Consequently, states following the Restatement also
incorporate its narrow construction of the privacy right.' 30 As noted
above, the Supreme Court has consistently applied strict scrutiny to
cases that threaten First Amendment rights, including cases that in-
volve the publication of private facts.13' Therefore, the Restatement
has balanced these competing interests, and has drawn the line be-
tween what is and what is not to be considered "private" at "common
decency, having due regard to the freedom of the press.., but also due
regard to the feelings of the individual and the harm that will be done
to him by the exposure.' 32 In this way, the Restatement attempts to
mirror the Supreme Court's efforts in balancing the rights of the indi-
vidual and the press in privacy cases.
C. How Privacy Law Relates to Witnesses' Rights in
Televised Trials
The Restatement recognizes that "it is not enough that the publicity
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.... When the sub-
ject-matter of the publicity is of legitimate public concern, there is no
invasion of privacy.' 33 Cameras are admitted to a courtroom pre-
cisely because state legislatures have determined that trials are of le-
gitimate public concern, and therefore, absent any prejudice to the
128. Restatement, supra note 125, § 652D cmnt. b., at 386.
129. Virgil v. Tune, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975); see Restatement, supra
note 125, § 652D cmt. c, at 387 ("Complete privacy does not exist in this world except
in a desert, and anyone who is not a hermit must expect and endure the ordinary
incidents of the community life of which he is a part.").
130. See, e.g., Forsher v. Bugliosi, 608 P.2d 716, 725 (Cal. 1980) (analyzing First
Amendment implications of private facts invasion of privacy cause of action); Indus-
trial Found. of the S. v. Texas Indust. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 684 (Tex. 1976)
(same).
131. See, e.g., Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (requiring restriction
on speech be "narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order"); Smith v.
Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1979) (holding that a state cannot prose-
cute a newspaper for publication of lawfully obtained information identifying a juve-
nile suspect in a homicide case, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest
order); cf. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (holding
that a state cannot fine a newspaper for reporting that a judge was under investiga-
tion); Oklahoma Publ'g Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (holding that a
judge cannot prohibit publication of information that has been publicly revealed at a
hearing); see also supra note 115.
132. Restatement, supra note 125, § 652D cnt. h, at 391 (emphasis added); see, e.g.,
Gilbert v. Medical Econs. Co., 665 F.2d 305, 307 (10th Cir. 1981) (balancing individ-
ual's privacy right against press right to disseminate newsworthy information); Berg v.
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957, 961 (D. Minn. 1948) (same).
133. Restatement, supra note 125, § 652D cmt. d, at 388 (emphasis added).
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parties, broadcast of the trial serves the public interest. 34 When
judges block the broadcast of one witness' testimony they are merely
preventing a form of publication-broadcast-that they have previ-
ously decided to allow. The camera was permitted in the first instance
presumably because the state has determined that the benefits of the
camera outweigh the risks, and the judge has found the risks in the
case to be insubstantial.135
When a judge considers the interests of a child witness or an under-
cover officer in preventing broadcast, such concerns are likely to
amount to compelling state interests weighing heavily in favor of ex-
cluding cameras for this testimony. 36 When the only interest pro-
tected by pulling the plug on television coverage is the personal
privacy right of a witness, however, the balance weighs more heavily
in favor of protecting the First Amendment. A judicial rule with the
potential to restrict free speech must be narrowly tailored to minimize
the constitutional infringement. It is in such situations that the
Supreme Court's existing protections for privacy should inform the
outcome of a judge's decision to allow camera coverage: states should
clearly tell judges which types of disclosures will warrant the extreme
measure of defeating a state's policy judgment to allow television cov-
erage of trials.137
III. OTHER FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS RAISED BY ALLOWING
JUDGES UNFETTERED DISCRETION TO PROHIBIT THE
BROADCAST OF A WrrINEss' TEsTIMONY
As discussed in part I, the Supreme Court has been cautious in
allowing state and federal governments to interfere with the media's
free speech rights by providing a privacy cause of action. 138 The
Supreme Court has required states to formulate rules that are nar-
134. See supra note 27 (listing arguments supporting cameras in the courtroom).
135. There may be situations where the judge has admitted cameras on the assunp-
tion that there would be no coverage of a particular witness-in other words, preju-
dice only occurs if this witness is shown, but coverage of the rest of the trial is not
problematic. This will not, however, affect the analysis here. The judge may-in fact
she must-always order cameras off if real prejudice will occur. See supra note 7. The
focus here is on situations in which the outcome of the case will not be affected, but
the witness' privacy will be affected.
136. See supra notes 60-78 and accompanying text (discussing interests related to
safety, criminal law enforcement, and child witnesses).
137. Cf. Webster Groves Sch. Dist. v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 898 F.2d 1371 (8th Cir.
1990) (permitting closure in case involving admission of disabled child to public
school); Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977) (permitting ban on media
access to death row inmates); Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access, and the
First Amendment, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 927, 958 (1992) ("In some rare instances, the pri-
vacy interests of witnesses ... may justify excluding both the press and the public. In
these cases, the courts should use the same criteria as those cases which justify restric-
tions on publication, and apply the compelling interest standard.") (citing Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1982)).
138. See supra Part II.
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rowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.139 The Court's re-
luctance to hamper free speech has not, however, been confined to the
privacy arena, where causes of action act as post-publication "punish-
ments" of speech. This part looks at two other areas of the Court's
jurisprudence where it has subjected to strict scrutiny rules that may
infringe on First Amendment rights: pre-publication restrictions on
the press, known as "prior restraints," and judicial interference with
the editorial process.
This part argues that blocking the broadcast of a witness' testimony
in a trial otherwise open to the broadcast media is an editorial judg-
ment and is analogous to a prior restraint, both of which constitute
violations of the First Amendment. Consequently, rules governing
the broadcast of witness testimony must include explicit state guide-
lines that elucidate what interests the state wishes to protect consis-
tent with the First Amendment.
A. Prior Restraints on Publication and Editorial Control of Content
As the previous discussion illustrates, the Supreme Court has held
that the First Amendment provides protections for the media in state-
created invasion of privacy causes of action.140 This evinces the
Court's reluctance to allow state and federal governments to interfere
with the media's free speech rights. This is particularly true when the
government attempts to prohibit or inhibit the exercise of free speech,
in contrast to allowing some form of post-speech punishment. "Re-
gardless of how beneficent-sounding the purposes of controlling the
press might be, we ... remain intensely skeptical about those meas-
ures that would allow government to insinuate itself into the editorial
rooms of this Nation's press."'' This section looks at two areas of
Supreme Court jurisprudence that illustrate the Court's strong protec-
tions of free speech: attempts to issue prior restraints on the publica-
tion of information, and attempts to interfere with editorial decisions.
1. Prior Restraints
As noted above, a prior restraint is a pre-publication restriction
placed on the dissemination of information. 4 2 Prior restraints tradi-
tionally have been considered "the most serious and the least tolera-
139. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
140. See supra Part II.
141. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 259 (1974) (White, J.,
concurring).
142. Bemabe-Riefkohl, supra note 3, at 268 (citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697, 721 (1931)); see also Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 598 (1976)
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("Prior restraints are particularly anathematic to the First
Amendment... ."); Marc A. Franklin & David A. Anderson, Mass Media Law 79
(5th ed. 1995) ("It has become almost axiomatic that . . . 'prior restraints' . . . are
especially objectionable under the First Amendment.").
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ble" form of First Amendment infringement. 143 The Supreme Court
has consistently held that any prior restraint on expression is pre-
sumptively invalid. 1 "
Prior restraints have been especially difficult for both commentators
and the Court to categorize with precision.145 It is useful, however, to
look at prior restraints as two general types of impediments to publi-
cation: the prior restraint in the form of a court injunction prohibiting
the publication of information, and the traditional prior restraint of a
licensing scheme that requires pre-publication government approval
of speech.
143. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 559; see also Franklin & Anderson, supra note 142,
at 80 (stating that "it has never been doubted that the First Amendment was intended
to at least forbid prior restraints").
144. See, eg., New York Tunes Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per
curiam) (stating that the government carries a heavy burden of showing justification
for a prior restraint); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419
(1971) (stating that there is a heavy presumption against any prior restraints on ex-
pression (citing Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968)); Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) ("Any system of prior restraints of expression
comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.");
Near, 283 U.S. at 713 (stating that the chief purpose of the free press guarantee is to
prevent "previous restraints" upon publication). For explanations of the kind of in-
formation that might warrant a prior restraint, see New York -unes, 403 U.S. at 730
(Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that a prior restraint will not be tolerated unless the
"disclosure... will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our
Nation or its people"); cf. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (holding
that a statute authorizing a prior restraint on the media may only be justified if "the
words [of the publication] are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as
to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent"); United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp.
990, 1000 (W.D. Wis.), dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding that an injunc-
tion against the publication of an article containing basic instructions on how to make
a hydrogen bomb was warranted because of "likelihood of direct, immediate and ir-
reparable injury to our nation and its people"). In Progressive, the injunction was
later lifted because another magazine had already published similar information.
Steven H. Shiffrin & Jesse L Choper, The First Amendment: Cases, Comments,
Questions 362 n.e (2d ed. 1996). For a survey of the Supreme Court's prior restraintjurisprudence, see Bernabe-Riefkohl, supra note 3, at 268-74, and Floyd Abrams,
Prior Restraints, 261 Prac. L. Inst. 375 (1988).
145. Se4 e.g., John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 Yale LJ. 409,
437 (1983) (describing the prior restraint doctrine as "so variously invoked and dis-
creptantly applied, and so often deflective of sound understanding, that it no longer
warrants use as an independent category of First Amendment analysis"); Harry
Kalven, Jr., Forward" Even When a Nation is at War, 85 Harv. L Rev. 3, 32 (1971)
(stating that "it is not altogether clear just what a prior restraint is or just what is the
matter with it"). Compare Near, 283 U.S. at 722-23 (declaring unconstitutional a prior
restraint in the form of an injunction), and New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714 (same),
with Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
390 (1973) (declaring constitutional a prior restraint in the form of an injunction).
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a. Classic Prior Restraints: Injunctions
The commonly recognized illustration of a "prior restraint" is a
court injunction against the publication of information. 14 6 One of the
most well known examples of this sort of pre-publication restriction
on the press is found in the Pentagon Papers case. 147 There, the Court
struck down an injunction that sought to prohibit the publication of an
article based on a secret government study of United States involve-
ment in the Vietnam War. In its per curium opinion, the Court
stressed that any system of prior restraints bears "a heavy presump-
tion against its constitutional validity."'14
Prior restraints are particularly offensive to the First Amendment
when the information sought to be suppressed relates to public court
proceedings. For example, the American Bar Association Standards
prohibit almost all prior restraints on the media:
Absent a clear and present danger to the fairness of a trial or other
compelling interest, no rule of court or judicial order should be
promulgated that prohibits representatives of the news media from
broadcasting or publishing any information in their possession relat-
ing to a criminal case.1 49
Attempts to censor media reports concerning judicial proceedings are
subject to these extraordinary safeguards because such reports about
the government and its operations are at the core of what the First
Amendment was designed to protect: 50 this information facilitates
self-government. Communications concerning judicial proceedings
have therefore received "special protection" by the Court, as prior
restraints in this area are particularly offensive to the constitutional
protections of the press.' 5 '
146. See, e.g., Near, 283 U.S. at 722-23 (striking down a statute that allowed the
court to prevent publication of material it deemed detrimental to public morals).
That case contains the Supreme Court's first detailed discussion of the doctrine of
prior restraints. Bemabe-Riefkohl, supra note 3, at 271.
147. New York Times, 403 U.S. 713.
148. Id at 714 (quoting Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 70); see supra note 144.
149. Standards for Criminal Justice (Amer. Bar Assoc. 1980) 8-3.1 (emphasis
added).
150. See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978)
("Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment,
there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that amendment was
to protect the free discussion of government affairs." (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384
U.S. 214, 218 (1966))).
151. Nebraska Press Assoc. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) ("For the same rea-
sons [that reports about judicial proceedings have received special protections from
punishment] the protection against prior restraint should have particular force as ap-
plied to reporting of criminal proceedings.. . ."); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469, 492 (175) ("The special protected nature of accurate reports of judicial proceed-
ings has repeatedly be recognized.").
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b. The Prior Restraint Through Licensing: The Problem of
Unfettered Discretion
Rules that require government approval before free speech rights
may be exercised are called licensing schemes. The Supreme Court
has said that such attempts to exercise control over speech are the
principal evil that the First Amendment was designed to address.'
The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that the government
may have an important interest in regulating competing uses of public
forums; therefore the Court allows some government licensing to ad-
dress these problems.' 53 Because of the potential injury licensing
schemes pose to First Amendment interests, however, the Court re-
quires that the discretion given to government officials not be overly
broad.'5
In order to minimize the risk to First Amendment freedoms, a li-
censing law that impacts free speech must contain "narrow, objective,
and definite standards to guide the licensing authority."' 55 Such cur-
tailment of discretion is necessary or "the danger of censorship and of
abridgment of our precious First Amendment freedoms is too
great.' 56 Moreover, such schemes have been subject to strict scrutiny
in the courts: the plan must be narrowly tailored to advance a "signifi-
cant" government interest.157
152. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931); see also Laurence H-L Tribe,
American Constitutional Law § 12-31, at 724 (1978) ("When the first amendment was
approved by the First Congress, it was undoubtedly intended to prevent government's
imposition of any system of proper restraints similar to the English licensing system
under which nothing could be printed without the approval of the state or church
authorities.").
153. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574-76 (1941).
154. Forsyth County v. National Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) (citing Freed-
man v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56 (1965)); see also Tribe, supra note 152, § 12-35
("[W]hile legislatures 'ordinarily may delegate power under broad standards ....
[the] area of permissible indefiniteness narrows ... when the regulation ... poten-
tially affects fundamental rights,' like those protected by the first amendment." (quot-
ing United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 274-75 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring))).
155. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969).
156. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975).
157. Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 130 (citing United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,
177 (1983)). The Court in Forsyth County also states that the licensing scheme must
not be based on the content of the speech. The decisions at issue in this Note require
the judge to look at the content of a witness' testimony when deciding whether or not
to allow the testimony to be broadcast. The Court's disapproval of content-based
decisions by government officials, including judges, provides further support for the
proposition that the constitutional validity of the decisions at issue in this Note should
not be taken for granted; on the contrary, such decisions demand scrutiny. See Forsyth
County, 505 U.S. at 135 (stating the rule that the First Amendment forbids the gov-
ernment from discriminating based on content); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members
of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (same); Arkansas Writ-
ers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987); Regan v. Tune, Inc., 468 U.S.
641, 648-49 (1984) (same).
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2. Editorial Control of the Content of Publications
The Supreme Court's rule in this area is easily summarized: "The
Government has been prohibited from interfering with the editorial
process by entering the composing room to give directives as to the
content of expression."'1 58 Closely related to the doctrine of prior re-
straints discussed above, this general principle has been applied with
equal weight to all branches of government. 59 "[O]ne of the most
basic principles of First Amendment jurisprudence"' 60 is that courts
should not enter into editors' decision-making processes by attempt-
ing to decide what information can and should be published. To do so
would make courts pre-publication censors.' 6'
Both common sense and the First Amendment provide the basis for
this widely accepted principle. Unlike journalists, judges are not
trained to know what information is or is not "important" to the gen-
eral public, in contrast to what would be of interest only because it is
sensational.' 62 These are journalistic distinctions that are inherently
editorial in nature and are, therefore, best left to the media to de-
cide.' 63 To permit the courts to make these distinctions could invite
censorship. 64 It is not difficult to imagine a situation where a judge
erroneously felt she alone was best equipped to decide what the cov-
erage should be so that the media's story matches the judge's own
perception of the most "accurate" depiction of the events taking place
in the trial.' 65
Courts may guard against the dissemination of private information
by controlling its release in court documents and proceedings. Once it
is in any way made known to the public, however, it is the media that
must be relied upon to decide what to broadcast." 6 This is true even
when the information is disclosed during a judicial proceeding over
which the judge otherwise has plenary control.' 67 "There is no special
158. Goldblum v. National Broad. Corp., 584 F.2d 904, 907 (9th Cir. 1978) (summa-
rizing the Supreme Court's rule in this area).
159. See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1986) (stating that courts,
like all branches of government, are forbidden from affecting the content or tenor of
media reports).
160. Bemabe-Riefkohl, supra note 3, at 289 n.159.
161. IM.
162. Dyk, supra note 137, at 958-59. Whether or not judges-or anyone-agrees
with journalists' decisions on what is "sensational" is, of course, another matter.
163. Id
164. Id
165. Cf. New York State Committee Report, supra note 5, at 36-38 (discussing ar-
guments of opponents of cameras in the courtroom, including, inter alia, that broad-
cast coverage of trials may give viewers a false impression of the justice system
because it does not show viewers exactly what the jury sees).
166. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975) (citing Miami Herald
Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)).
167. Cf. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 614 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The Con-
stitution does not make us arbiters of the image that a televised state criminal trial
projects to the public.").
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perquisite of the judiciary which enables it, as distinguished from
other institutions of democratic government, to suppress, edit, or cen-
sor events which transpire in proceedings before it." 63 Nevertheless,
the judge may still be called upon to exercise what appears to be an
editorial judgment in choosing which witnesses' testimony will be
broadcast and which will not in situations where the broadcast itself
could have a measurable impact on a particular witness.169
B. Potential Constitutional Problems with Allowing Judges
Discretion to Block the Broadcast of Witnesses' Testimony" °
A conventional violation of the doctrine against prior restraints is
presented if the judge prevents the media from broadcasting testi-
mony that it has already recorded. If the judge allows the television
crew to record a witness' testimony, that videotape is information the
press actually has "in hand," and any judicial interference with the
media's use of the videotape would constitute a prior restraint: it is a
pre-publication-pre-broadcast-restriction because the judge is
168. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947); see also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
169. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 574 (1981) (noting that trial courts must
be vigilant in preserving fair trial right of a defendant); cf. State v. Palm Beach News-
papers, 395 So. 2d 544,549 (Fla. 1981) ("The electronic media's presence in Florida's
courtrooms is desirable, but it is not indispensable. The presence of witnesses is indis-
pensable. That difference should always affect but never control a trial judge in his
approach to the exercise of his discretion in excluding electronic media coverage of
... any witness.").
170. In addition to the problems discussed in this section, there may also be a
potential procedural due process concern at play in the judge's decision to prevent the
broadcast of a witness' testimony. When a state sets a system whereby cameras are
admitted to trial courts, it has arguably set up a benefit that may not be denied
without adequate procedures, and the First Amendment certainly sets up a right-
free speech-that may not be infringed without due process of law. The Supreme
Court has found that the Constitution requires particular procedures be followed
before free speech may be curtailed; these procedures have been summarized, in
relevant part, as follows:
(1) The burden of proof must rest on government to justify any restraint on
free expression prior to its judicial review and on government to
demonstrate the particular facts necessary to sustain a limitation on
expressive behavior... (6) A scheme of censorship or licensing must assure
a "prompt final judicial decision" reviewing any "interim and possibly
erroneous denial of a license;" (7) If a prior restraint is ordered by a court,
the state must either stay the order pending its appeal or provide immediate
appellate review.
Tribe, supra note 152, § 12-36, at 735-36 (citations omitted). If the judge makes no
findings of fact about why the press should not be allowed to show a particular wit-
ness' testimony, the first constitutional requirement listed above is violated. If the
state provides no procedures for appealing the judge's decision, the sixth and seventh
requirements are violated. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that many state
rules in this area make unreviewable any judicial decision regarding the operation of
cameras in the courtroom. See, e.g., Lassiter, Appendix, supra note 4, at 1023 (summa-
rizing Arizona's rule that grants judges "sole discretion" to prohibit the broadcast of a
witness, and making judges' decision "not subject to judicial review").
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preventing the broadcast of the witness' testimony, as opposed to im-
posing or allowing some form of later punishment. There do not ap-
pear to be any cases that address this problem. Judicial decision such
as this is arguably permissible because there is no constitutional right
to broadcast a witness' testimony.17 1 Nevertheless, because it is a
prior restraint on the media, it should bear a heavy presumption
against its validity."~
Even if the judge makes her decision before the camera records the
witness' testimony, thereby preventing the press from actually ob-
taining the information it seeks to broadcast (i.e., the videotape of the
witness' testimony), a prior restraint problem is arguably presented.
In its licensing cases, discussed above, 73 the Court was concerned
about situations where the government had broad discretion in decid-
ing questions that could potentially impact the free exercise of First
Amendment rights. It reasoned that unfettered governmental discre-
tion to suppress speech would present an impermissible danger to free
speech rights. 7 4 The same may be said in the situation where a judge
is given no guidance on how to evaluate a witness' request that her
testimony not be broadcast. When there are no "narrowly drawn, rea-
sonable and definite standards"'175 the risk is high that the judge will
make her decision based on factors that do not rise to the level of a
compelling-or even a valid-state interest.
In the area of liability for the publication of private information, the
press has been the beneficiary of the presumption against the validity
of prior restraints. Given the notion that a prior restraint is a drastic
action, courts have generally refused to allow prior restraints designed
to protect individual privacy, finding that any alleged harm is either
inadequate or too speculative to warrant this form of government in-
tervention. 176 Thus, a court will generally require more than a claim
that publication will cause an invasion of privacy before it will permit
a prior restraint. 177
Moreover, the information at issue here is at the core of the First
Amendment's protections because it concerns the operations of a
branch of the government. 78 Thus, any pre-publication restriction
that relates to a judicial proceeding, and is placed upon the media by a
court, should be regarded with skepticism. The nature of the informa-
171. See supra note 21.
172. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
175. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951).
176. Abrams, supra note 144, at 422; see also, Nebraska Press Assoc. v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 569 (1976) (stating that the probability of harm in this case was not enough
to show "the degree of certainty our cases on prior restraint require").
177. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971); see supra
note 144.
178. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
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tion at stake-i.e., a witness' testimony-when looked at in combina-
tion with the First Amendment problems present in judicial decisions
regarding the broadcast of a witness' testimony, strongly supports
placing the onus on states to articulate clear rules designed to protect
the free speech interests implicated by a witness' request that her tes-
timony not be televised.
Most importantly, however, is the nature of the imposition on free
speech that is presented by a judge's decision to prevent the broadcast
of a witness' testimony. Such a ruling presents many of the same
problems the prior restraint cases are meant to address. For example,
prior restraints in any form are potentially threatening to First
Amendment freedoms because they involve abstract assessments bal-
ancing the value of speech against its possible social harm, and are
particularly susceptible to overenforcement. 179 In other words, be-
cause the harm the speech will allegedly cause has not yet come to
pass, the assessment of this harm is purely speculative. The specula-
tive nature of the inquiry makes it more likely that judges will be in-
clined to prohibit speech that would not, in fact, have caused any
harm. When a judge decides that a witness' privacy interests outweigh
the press' free speech rights-and the right of the public to view the
"speech"-she is engaging in precisely the sort of abstract balancing
of interests that inspired the current abhorrence of prior restraints.
Moreover, given both her personal involvement in the litigation and
her duty to ensure a fair trial, 80 it would be only natural for the judge
to be inclined to overprotect the rights of the parties before her, in-
cluding witnesses who implore the judge to protect their "privacy."''
Furthermore, conflicts with the prior restraints doctrine are not the
only problems presented by granting judges unfettered discretion in
deciding which witnesses' testimony may be broadcast. A judge's de-
cision allowing the broadcast of some testimony, and denying the
broadcast of other testimony due to a witness' privacy interest, is a
forbidden editorial judgment about which parts of a trial are more
"newsworthy." The judge is deciding which testimony is important
enough-"newsworthy" enough-that the public's right to know out-
weighs any possible privacy interest of the witness. This type of ruling
can only be justified as necessary to protect compelling state interests
in privacy if the judge is constrained in her reasoning by clear state
guidelines that explicate exactly what kinds of information will be
deemed protected for privacy reasons, and what categories of wit-
nesses will be deemed worthy of protection.
179. Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66
Mlnn. L. Rev. 11, 49-63, 93 (1981).
180. See supra note 7.
181. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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IV. STATES MUST ARTICULATE CLEAR GUIDELINES FOR
DECIDING PRIVACY VERSUS FREE SPEECH QUESTIONS RAISED BY
BROADCASTING WITNESSES' TESTIMONY
As seen above, in cases that present a threat to First Amendment
interests-whether post-publication causes of action,' 82 or pre-publi-
cation government interference with the content or dissemination of
information183-the Supreme Court has consistently required state
rules to be narrowly tailored to protect a compelling government in-
terest. This part concludes that existing privacy jurisprudence, which
balances precisely the interests at stake in judicial determinations to
prevent the broadcast of a witness' testimony, should form the basis
for new state guidelines.
A. The Supreme Court's Treatment of Privacy Causes of Action,
Prior Restraints, and Editorial Decisions Supports a Requirement
that Rules Allowing Judges to Prohibit Broadcast Coverage of
Witnesses be Narrowly Tailored to Protect a Compelling State Interest
The Supreme Court has held that the method by which state gov-
ernments may protect personal privacy rights is to control the dissemi-
nation of private information implicated in government actions,
including court proceedings.184 The Court has maintained that the
publication of information available to the public generally may not
be penalized; 85 therefore, dissemination of information concerning
events that take place in open court is presumed to be protected. 186
When access to a trial has not been restricted, the witnesses' testimony
is part of the information available to the public. This factor weighs in
favor of requiring that state rules relating to the broadcast of witness
testimony be narrowly tailored in order to protect the interest in pub-
lication that the Court has already recognized.
The traditional rule that there is no protected privacy interest in a
person's likeness or image" provides further support for protections
for the press' free speech in televised trials. Moreover, witnesses have
182. See supra Part II.
183. See supra Part III.
184. See Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524, 534 (1989); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975); supra Part II.A.
185. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 541; Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at 494-95; see also Forsher
v. Bugliosi, 608 P.2d 716, 726-27 (Cal. 1980). Note that the Court considers civil ac-
tions for damages to be "punishments" of speech, as evidenced in these cases.
186. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980).
187. See Restatement, supra note 125, § 652D cmt. b (stating that because "there is
no liability for giving further publicity to what the plaintiff himself leaves open to the
public eye," he therefore "cannot complain when his photograph is taken while he is
walking down the public street and is published"). There are, however, protections
for a person's likeness or image if it is appropriated for commercial purposes. See
Restatement, supra note 125, § 652C; see, e.g., White v. Samsung Elec. America Inc.,
989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
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ordinarily not been able to object to the fact that they are compelled
to testify in front of the public and press. 1'8 Therefore, if a person has
no protected interest in preventing the broadcast of her image when
she is filmed while appearing in a public place, a person should have
no protected interest in the video image of her testimony in a public,
broadcasted trial.18 9
It is true that the broadcast media enjoys less hearty Frst Amend-
ment protections than other media and has no constitutional right to
broadcast trial testimony.190 Nevertheless, strict scrutiny applies to
government-imposed regulations on broadcast speech if that speech
touches on important public issues.19' Judicial proceedings are clearly
part of the legitimate public interest. Indeed, "[b]y placing the infor-
mation in the public domain on official court records, the State must
be presumed to have concluded that the public interest was thereby
being served." 192 When a state has decided that cameras should be
allowed in the courtroom, and a judge has found that no prejudice to
the trial's outcome will result from the broadcast coverage, the public
interest is presumably being served by such a broadcast. Again, this
factor supports the protection of the press' right to choose which wit-
nesses to broadcast during televised trials.
Furthermore, as a general proposition, editorial judgments are
deemed to be beyond the scope of judicial powers. 193 Once a trial is
opened to the broadcast media, the selection of which information to
broadcast is an editorial judgment. Consequently, when states allow
judges discretion to bar the broadcast of a particular witness' testi-
mony who will presumably withhold consent based upon an interest in
maintaining privacy of information-information that will be publicly
available to all observers of the trial present in the courtroom, both
public and press-those states are allowing judges to engage in an ad
hoc balancing of First Amendment editorial rights and free speech on
the one hand, and privacy rights on the other. This sort of balancing
not only treads upon the province of the editor, but also bears a strik-
ing resemblance to a prior restraint on press.'9 Judges should, there-
fore, be guided by rules modeled after privacy case law, where both
the Supreme Court and state courts have frequently embarked upon
just such a balancing.
Current methods of resolving conflicts between First Amendment
rights and witnesses' privacy rights are inadequate. Requiring the
188. This is due to the presumption of openness in trial court proceedings. See
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575.
189. See supra note 123.
190. See supra note 19.
191. Federal Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,
380-81 (1984).
192. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975); see supra note 27.
193. See supra Part .B.2.
194. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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consent of witnesses in a televised trial will result in a greater degree
of infringement of broadcasters' speech than necessary to protect the
witnesses' interests. Such infringement is, therefore, constitutionally
overbroad. In states that do not require an affirmative showing of
good cause in order to prevent the broadcast, 195 requiring consent al-
lows witnesses who would not, in fact, be adversely affected by the
broadcast coverage of their testimony to nevertheless preclude that
coverage. 196 The scope of a consent requirement may well be permis-
sibly narrow when employed to safeguard interests such as safety and
criminal law enforcement, because these are interests that implicate
concerns widely recognized as meriting special protections.197 If the
sole interest protected is personal privacy, however, the balance tips in
favor of the First Amendment rights of the press and public, especially
given the Supreme Court's reluctance to recognize a constitutional
protection of private information.' 98
Overbreadth in state rules poses particularly difficult problems
when it has the potential to infringe upon freedom of speech and free-
dom of the press."9 State action that has such potential is subject to
strict scrutiny in the courts: the state rules must be promulgated to
promote a compelling government interest and must be narrowly tai-
lored to protect that interest.2°° This strict scrutiny analysis is present
both in the Supreme Court's cases regarding the publication of private
information and in the areas of pre-publication interference with
speech such as editorial judgments and prior restraints-which pose
even more serious threats to First Amendment rights. In other words,
this strict scrutiny analysis is incorporated into all of the areas of the
Court's jurisprudence that relate to the question of judicial discretion
to block the broadcast of witnesses' testimony. Thus, when personal
privacy interests are the sole concern of a witness objecting to televi-
sion coverage of her testimony, judicial discretion must be guided by
explicit and detailed state guidelines on what private information is
protected by that particular state, and decisions must be made on a
case-by-case basis.20'
195. See supra note 46. Requiring good cause to be shown is problematic in its own
right for non-party witnesses, because these witnesses will typically not have the ad-
vice of counsel. Dyer & Hauserman, supra note 2, at 1654.
196. McCall, supra note 3, at 1564.
197. See supra Part I.B & infra Part IV.C.1.
198. See supra Part II.A.
199. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989) ("[T]he sensitivity and sig-
nificance of the interests presented in clashes between First Amendment and privacy
rights counsel relying on limited principles that sweep no more broadly than the ap-
propriate context of the instant case.").
200. Id. at 541.
201. States that have no privacy cause of action still presumably have an interest in
protecting privacy. See supra note 125 (listing several states that have declined to
adopt a cause of action for invasion of privacy based on the publication of private
facts). When creating the guidelines called for in this Note, these states may find it
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B. States Should Look to Privacy Law Protections of Free Speech
in Deciding Whether Witnesses Should be Able to Block the
Broadcast of Their Testimony
The Supreme Court has time and time again shown its reluctance to
stay the free hand of the press. It frowns upon prior restraints. It
prohibits courts from engaging in editorial judgments. It severely lim-
its the protections states may give in the form of privacy causes of
action. In all of these areas, the Supreme Court has said that First
Amendment free speech rights must be protected by strict scrutiny of
state rules that have the potential to inhibit free speech: the rules
must be necessary to protect a compelling state interest, and must be
narrowly tailored to minimize the injury to press.
When the decision has been made to allow a trial to be televised, all
further decisions relating to the form and content of the trial's broad-
cast belong in the hands of the media. The only justification for a
departure from this general principle is that such a departure is essen-
tial to protect a compelling state interest. Moreover, that departure
must be carefully circumscribed to achieving its goals; it may not im-
pinge any more than necessary on the freedom of the press to report
on the events transpiring in the courtroom.
In order to ensure that they remain faithful to the Supreme Court's
protections of the First Amendment, states should look to an area in
their own jurisprudence that has already attempted to emulate that
Court's decisions: laws protecting private facts. Here the balance be-
tween privacy and the First Amendment has already been struck, the
precision cuts made, and the interests protected. By looking to these
laws, states should be able to more easily delineate the exact contours
of their state's interests in privacy, shortening the rope of judicial dis-
cretion that could previously have been used to choke off the First
Amendment rights of broadcasters covering televised trials.2°
C. Application of Privacy Law Analysis to Particular Categories
of Witnesses
The foregoing analysis does not dictate any particular conclusion
for the states; it allows states to decide for themselves-within the
bounds of the Supreme Court's First Amendment parameters-what
useful to look both to other states' privacy laws and to the Supreme Court's jurispru-
dence in this area.
202. There is clearly a risk that if states adopt the explicit guidelines called for in
this Note, judges may be less inclined to allow the broadcast media access to trials in
the first place. The question of whether judges should be allowed broad discretion to
forbid camera coverage of trials is not within the limited scope of this Note. Never-
theless, if a judge does not allow cameras in the courtroom for the sole purpose of
pacifying a witness who would not otherwise satisfy the state's guidelines for protect-
ing witnesses' privacy, that judge would be deliberately side-stepping the state's policy
judgments regarding both cameras in the courtroom and the legitimate privacy inter-
ests of witnesses.
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interests in privacy are worthy of state protection. This section takes a
broad look at how employing a privacy law-based approach would af-
fect the general categories of witnesses. It then examines some hypo-
thetical situations with potential privacy implications and explores
how an application of the privacy law-based framework may play out
for the affected witnesses.
1. Witnesses with Concerns Relating to Safety, Law Enforcement,
Youth, and Similar Considerations
Although First Amendment rights are implicated by a restriction on
the coverage of witnesses in these categories, judicial discretion in
preventing the broadcast of the testimony of these witnesses should
usually be permissible. These witnesses are likely to advance state in-
terests of the "highest order," such as safety, effective criminal law
enforcement, and the protection of minors.20 3
Even in these categories, however, blanket rules are likely to be
overbroad, infringing more speech than necessary to protect the im-
portant state interests. 2°4 For example, most state rules regarding
"juveniles" protect all youths under the age of eighteen.2 °5 It is not
difficult to imagine a case in which a confident seventeen-year-old is
called to testify about some important but mundane fact in a criminal
trial, such as the exact time the defendant clocked into work on the
day of the crime. This testimony would touch on no "private" mat-
ters, would likely last only a matter of minutes, and would not involve
a witness who was likely to be intimidated by the camera. In this situ-
ation, a blanket rule forbidding the coverage of the testimony of "mi-
nors" would clearly restrict more speech than necessary to serve the
state interest in protecting child witnesses. Therefore, even in situa-
tions where the witness' interests are likely strong enough to outweigh
the freedom of the press, decisions should always be made on a case-
by-case basis, thereby ensuring that the rulings will be narrowly tai-
lored to protect only those witnesses who truly need protection.
2. Witnesses With Concerns Relating Only to Privacy
Looking to their own state's explicit guidelines regarding the limits
of protected privacy, judges will be able to analyze the anticipated
content of testimony, and rule accordingly. The effect of having a uni-
form set of guidelines within each state will be to rein in judicial dis-
203. See supra Part I.B.2-4.
204. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 25.20.010 (Michie 1996) (making age of majority 18
years old); Ark. Code. Ann. § 9-25-101 (Michie 1987) (same); Cal. Family Code
§ 6500 (West 1994) (same); Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.52 (1993) (same); Mont. Code
Ann. § 41-1-101 (1995) (same); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-6-1 (Michie 1978) (same); cf.
Ala. Code § 26-1-5 (1996) (making age of majority 19 years old); Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§ 14-1-101 (Michie 1977) (same).
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cretion that can lead to the overprotection of privacy rights-at the
expense of First Amendment rights. Setting specific guidelines will
also ensure more uniformity among judges' rulings within each
state2 06 will give television stations notice of the type of information
each state considers private, and will help witnesses conserve their en-
ergies in objecting only when there is a reasonable likelihood that
their objections will be heeded.
Although this Note does not advocate the adoption of any particu-
lar set of privacy law principles, it is useful to explore some hypotheti-
cal situations in which a witness is likely to object to the broadcast of
her testimony due to privacy concerns. The Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 652D is the most common formulation of the private facts
invasion of privacy cause of action,207 and it will, therefore, be used in
these hypothetical examples to guide the judge's decision on the ques-
tion of whether to broadcast the testimony.
a. Witness #1: The Privacy of an Abortion2"
Witness #1 has been subpoenaed to testify at a civil trial. The plain-
tiff in the case, an abortion-rights activist, is suing a group of anti-
abortion protesters for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The acts that led to the lawsuit stem from a partic-
ular protest in front of the plaintiff's gynecologist's office, in which the
defendant protesters carried signs bearing the plaintiff's name and in-
dicating that the plaintiff was about to undergo an abortion. The
name of Witness #1 was also listed on the signs; however, she has cho-
sen not to join in plaintiff's lawsuit. Witness #1 will be called by the
plaintiff to testify regarding the circumstances of her name being
placed on the protesters' signs, and defense attorneys plan to cross-
examine her about the fact that she did undergo an abortion. Witness
#1 has strong personal reasons for not wanting her abortion to be pub-
licly known.
The judge has decided to allow the trial to be televised, largely be-
cause both parties have consented, glad for the broadcast exposure of
their respective causes. Witness #1 has asked the judge to bar the
broadcast of her testimony because it invades her right to privacy.
The Restatement says publicity must be "highly offensive to the or-
dinary reasonable man"m in order to be protected2ia and requires
that it is of no legitimate public concern. 211 In a privacy cause of ac-
206. Cf. Pate, supra note 2, at 358-59 (noting that lack of uniformity discourages
reluctant witnesses from coming forward); Gardner, supra note 47, at 506-09 (discuss-
ing merits of a uniform set of guidelines governing cameras in the courtroom).
207. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
208. This hypothetical is based loosely on the facts of Doe v. Mills, 536 N.W.2d 824
(Mich. App. 1995).
209. Restatement, supra note 125, § 652D cmt. c, at 387.
210. Restatement, supra note 125, § 652D(a).
211. Restatement, supra note 125, § 652D(b).
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tion, a court may find that it is a question of fact whether or not the
publicity was "highly offensive; ' 212 it is a close question that calls for a
policy judgment. As such, it would be reasonable for a state to con-
clude that the unauthorized or unwanted publication of information of
this nature is highly offensive.
Assuming that the state finds this information is private, it still must
determine if the publicity relates to a matter of legitimate public con-
cern. A state inclined to protect such information could look to its
traditional handling of a person's medical treatment or condition,
which is not considered a matter of legitimate public concern. 13
Moreover, the Restatement protects information related to sexual re-
lations.214 Thus, this state may find that "abortion concerns matters of
sexual relations and medical treatment, both of which are regarded as
private matters, 21 5 and is thus protected under existing state rules.21 6
It would be reasonable for a state to recognize that these are impor-
tant privacy interests,217 and as such, should be protected when they
arise in the context of the broadcast of a witness' testimony if that
witness so desires.
212. See, e.g., Mills, 536 N.W.2d at 829.
213. 1l at 830; see also Swickard v. Wayne County Med. Exam'r, 475 N.W.2d 304,
310-14 (1991); cf Restatement, supra note 125, § 652D cmt. b, at 386 (listing "unpleas-
ant... or humiliating illnesses" as a normally private matter).
214. Restatement, supra note 125, § 652D cmt. b, at 386; see Mills, 536 N.W.2d at
829.
215. Mills, 536 N.W.2d at 830.
216. There may be disagreement over whether or not abortion is a matter of "legiti-
mate public concern." Some states may decide that the public's interest in the abor-
tion controversy is high indeed, and therefore there is no invasion of privacy by
exposing the identity-whether it be on placards used during a protest or on the air-
waves during the broadcast of a trial-of someone who has an abortion. A state may
very well reach the opposite conclusion, however, and find that the identity of such a
person is not a matter of public concern. The argument of these states may parallel
the following:
The fact that [persons] engage in an activity in which the public can be said
to have a general interest does not render every aspect of their lives subject
to public disclosure. Most persons are connected with some activity ... as to
which the public can be said as a matter of law to have a legitimate interest
or curiosity. To hold as a matter of law that private facts as to such persons
are also within the area of legitimate public interest could indirectly expose
everyone's private life to public view.
Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 1975). Whatever specific decision a
state makes is irrelevant to this analysis so long as the states lay down specific guide-
lines that embrace these sorts of questions, and protect the competing rights of pri-
vacy and free speech.
217. Restatement, supra note 125, § 652D cmt. h, at 391 ("In determining what is a
matter of legitimate public interest, account must be taken of the customs and con-
ventions of the community; and in the last analysis what is proper becomes a matter
of the community mores.").
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b. Witnesses #2 and #3: The Privacy of Sexual Orientation1 8
Witnesses #2 and #3 have been called to testify at a civil trial. The
plaintiffs are challenging, on equal protection grounds, a recently en-
acted amendment to the state constitution that prohibits the state gov-
ernment from establishing homosexuals and bisexuals as a protected
minority class. The court challenge to the amendment will be tele-
vised with the consent of both the plaintiff and the defendant; it will
be a bench trial.
Witness #2 is a gay father of two. He was in his late 20's when he
came to terms with his sexual identity; he and his wife divorced when
their children were very young. Although his wife is the primary
caregiver to their children, now in their teens, he has been a signifi-
cant presence in their lives. The children visit Witness #2 and his long-
time partner every other weekend, and spend two months of every
summer with them.
The plaintiffs have called Witness #2 to rebut one of the state's ar-
guments in support of the amendment, namely, that the amendment is
necessary to promote the physical and psychological well-being of
children. He will testify that his children have not been adversely af-
fected by their familial situation, and that he and his partner provide a
stable, loving, and nurturing environment for the children. In addi-
tion, he will tell the court that he and his former wife have been able
to reach an amicable agreement about the manner in which to raise
the children, that is, their religious affiliation and moral upbringing.
His family and close friends know his sexual orientation, but his em-
ployer and most others do not. Witness #2 has endeavored to keep his
sexual orientation secret, to the extent that it is possible. He has
asked that his testimony not be televised in order to protect his own
privacy, as well as the privacy of his children and his partner.
Witness #3 is a 20-year-old college student who was raised by an
openly lesbian couple. He has also been called by the plaintiffs to
rebut the argument that the amendment is necessary to protect the
traditional family. Witness #3 will testify that although being raised by
two women presented some problems of social acceptance among
others, he was not harmed physically or psychologically by the compo-
sition of his family. He will testify that he is not gay, he was never
mistreated as a child, and he loves his parents.
Witness #3 has become an outspoken advocate for the rights of
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. Although most of his friends at school
do not know that Witness #3 was raised by a lesbian couple, he has
made no secret of his work for the gay rights movement. Neverthe-
218. This hypothetical is based loosely on the facts of Evans v. Romer, No. Civ. A.
92 CV 7223, 1993 WL 518586 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1993), affd, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994),
affd, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996).
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less, he has asked that his testimony not be broadcast, claiming that
the broadcast would invade his privacy.
An amendment to a state's constitution is unquestionably a matter
of legitimate public interest. This does not, however, necessarily mean
that a state cannot or should not honor the requests of Witnesses #2
and #3. Each witness presents his own unique set of considerations.
As previously noted, information regarding a person's sexual rela-
tions is generally considered private, and worthy of protection. 19 In
the case of Witness #2, apart from the fact that he is testifying in an
important case,2 0 there seems to be no reason to find that his sexual
orientation is a matter of public concern. 1 He has told only his fam-
ily and close friends2 1 and, therefore, seems to fall within the realm of
protected privacy. Additionally, the judge may consider that the pri-
vacy interests of the witness' children add to her inclination to block
the broadcast coverage of this witness' testimony. Once again, it
would be reasonable for a state to conclude that it considers this type
219. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
220. The Restatement does state that people who are involuntary participants in a
judicial proceeding that attracts public attention "are regarded as properly subject to
the public interest," and the "authorized publicity is not limited to the event that itself
arouses the public interest." Restatement, supra note 125, § 652D cmnt. f, at 389; see
also infra note 226 and accompanying text. If this particular aspect of the invasion of
privacy cause of action-for publication of private facts-is incorporated without
modification into the regulation of broadcast coverage, the result may seem unfair;
after all, the court itself is ultimately in control of what information will be broadcast
during the proceeding. This, then, is a situation where the state may decide that its
guidelines relating to the broadcast of witness' testimony should depart from the re-
quirements of an invasion of privacy cause of action. If, however, the privacy interests
are not such that they meet the Supreme Court's requirements for closing the court-
room altogether, see, e.g., Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984) (stating that strict
scrutiny applies to attempts to close courtroom to press and spectators); Globe News-
paper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-08 (1982) (holding that strict scrutiny
applies to the closure of (criminal) trials, and the determination to close a trial or any
portion thereof, must be made on a case-by-case basis), the information about Wit-
ness #2 will presumably be reported in other media, and will therefore be made pub-
lic. Thus, a specific guideline directing judges to block the broadcast of this type of
testimony will fail to protect the privacy interests of this witness. Predicaments such
as this, however, are presented in every trial. States will have to weigh the arguments
relating to the qualitative difference between cameras and other media when deciding
this type of question. See supra note 54 and accompanying text; cf State v. Green, 395
So. 2d 532, 536 (Fla. 1981) (finding that "the single addition of the camera in the
courtroom in these circumstances should not increase tension significantly, given the
fact that electronic media will report the proceedings whether or not its camera is
actually in the courtroom").
221. Cf Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 772-73 (1983) (finding
the newsworthiness of a college student body president's sex change operation was a
question of fact; it was not necessarily newsworthy despite the fact that the person
was in a political position that garnered public attention).
222. See Restatement, supra note 125, § 652D cmt. b, at 386 (contrasting facts left
"open to the public eye," which are not protected, with those "reveal[ed] only to...
family [and] close personal friends," which are generally protected).
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of information protected privacy,'2 and, therefore, the judge should
honor this witness' request not to have his testimony broadcast.
Witness #3 presents a different set of questions and circumstances.
The Restatement does not protect information a person has already
made public 2 4 It also contains less protection for people who volun-
tarily thrust themselves into the public eye.'- By publicly campaign-
ing for gay rights, Witness #3 has likely made himself a public figure
on this issue. Also, although he has not put information relating to
the sexual orientation of his parents into the public arena, this infor-
mation is closely associated with the cause he has chosen to champion.
Moreover, in the case of a voluntary public figure, "the legitimate in-
terest of the public in the individual may extend beyond those matters
which are themselves made public, and to some reasonable extent
may include information as to matters that would otherwise be pri-
vate."'1 6 Hence, the judge could reasonably conclude that consistent
with her state's guidelines on the broadcast of witness' testimony in
televised trials-guidelines which incorporate that state's privacy pro-
tections from its tort of invasion of privacy-Witness #3's request to
prohibit the broadcast of his testimony in this important trial should
be denied.'
c. Witness # 4: The Privacy of the Average Person 8
Witness #4 has been called to testify in a murder trial. She is a
working woman in her late-forties. She is married and has two grown
children.
The defendant in the case is charged with the shooting of a store
clerk during an armed robbery. A security camera has captured the
event on film. The defense contends that the man pictured in the
black-and-white video tape is not the defendant. The defense plans to
call a witness who will testify that the defendant was wearing a red
jacket on the day of the murder. Eye witnesses to the murder did not
see the killer's face, but will testify that he was wearing a black jacket
during the shooting. The trial has garnered media attention because
the victim was a newlywed, and the crime took place on Christmas
Eve.
223. See supra note 217.
224. Restatement, supra note 125, § 652D cmt. b, at 385.
225. Id. cmt. e, at 389.
226. Id; see id cmt. h, at 391.
227. Cf. Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1984) (finding that the
sexual orientation of a San Francisco man who saved the life of President Ford during
an assassination attempt, and was later the subject of national press, was newsworthy
and not private, even though he had not previously revealed his homosexuality to
relatives in the Midwest).
228. This hypothetical was inspired by the facts and reasoning of People v.
Solomon, 524 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (1988).
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Witness #4 has been subpoenaed to testify for the prosecution in
this murder case. She will testify that as she was leaving the store, just
moments before the shooting, she saw the defendant enter the store
wearing a black jacket-the security video shows Witness #4 leaving
the store at the same moment the killer entered.
The judge has determined that Witness #4 faces no risk to her safety
if her testimony is broadcast, and Witness #4 herself does not fear for
her safety. She has, however, expressed to the judge her wish that her
testimony not be broadcast-she simply does not want to be on
television.
In this situation, none of the Restatement indicia of an invasion of
privacy is present. A court may find significant the fact that "it does
not appear that this case will deal with any explicit sexual testimony or
graphic depiction of nudity," 9 which are possibly the most common
types of protected information. Additionally, the media interest stems
not from any private information that may be revealed by the witness,
but rather from the nature of the crime itself.2 0 The court could rea-
sonably conclude that Witness #4's objection does not stem from a
privacy concern at all-at least not one protected by the state's formu-
lation of the law of invasion of privacy, and, consequently, its protec-
tion of witnesses.
Moreover, Witness #4 has become involved in a matter of legitimate
public concern-a brutal crime; she was "so unfortunate as to be pres-
ent when [the crime was] committed."'2 31 Therefore, Witness #4 her-
self is "regarded as properly subject to the public interest. 2 3 It
would be reasonable for the court to conclude that this witness' objec-
tion to broadcast coverage should not be allowed to defeat the state's
policy judgments that allowed the broadcast media access to this
courtroom.2
33
CONCLUSION
We live in a world where "the general public does not believe that
the media version of an event is the way they would see it themselves.
Like it or not, America sees the world through the lens of a camera,
and there is nothing like seeing it for yourself."'  If we are truly to
value the public's right to evaluate and critique our government in
general, and the court system in particular, we must give people the
maximum amount of information consistent with the protection of
other competing rights. When the face-off is between the First
Amendment and personal privacy interests, that balance is a precari-
229. Solomon, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 1013.
230. Idt
231. Restatement, supra note 125, § 652D cmt. f, at 389.
232. Id
233. See supra note 27.
234. Zemans, supra note 27, at 173.
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ous one, requiring precise rulings that minimize the damage to either
right. Given the many restrictions already placed on television cover-
age of trials, states should pay scrupulous attention to their own
guidelines to ensure that decisions affecting the many people that
make up "the public" are not subsumed by the more immediately
sympathetic witness pleading "privacy."
Notes & Observations
